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A MATTER OF TRUST: INSTITUTIONAL EMPLOYER
LIABILITY FOR ACTS OF CHILD ABUSE BY EMPLOYEES
Child abuse is not a black problem, a brown problem, or a
white problem. Child abusers are found in the ranks of the
unemployed, the blue-collar worker, the white-collar worker,
and the professional. They are Protestant, Catholic, Jewish,
Baptist, and atheist.'
Despite public abhorrence of child abuse,2 a reported 2.5
million children suffered abuse and neglect in 1990.3 This con-
stitutes a thirty-one percent increase from 19854 and is presum-
ably "just a fraction of the actual incidence of child abuse and
neglect."5 The fact that the increase in reported incidents of
abuse results partially from greater public awareness and mod-
ifications in reporting procedures 6 should not obscure the very
real fact that child abuse occurs with alarming and increasing
frequency in the United States.7
1. Leroy H. Pelton, Child Abuse and Neglect: The Myth of Classlessness, in CHILD ABUSE:
COsanSSION AND OanSSION 87, 87 (Joanne V. Cook & Roy T. Bowles eds., 1980) (citing Brian
G. Fraser, Independent Representation for the Abused and Neglected Child: The Guardian Ad
Litem, 13 CAL. W. L. REV. 16, 20 (1976)).
2. See RACHEL CALAM & CRISTINA FRANCHI, CHILD ABUSE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 3 (1987)
(stating that "no one in their right mind would damage a young child").
3. Robert Green, Oprah Winfrey Urges Passage of Child Abuse Bill, Reuters, Nov. 12, 1991,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File; see also Karen S. Peterson, Reports of Child
Abuse Accelerate, USA TODAY, Apr. 3, 1990, at D1 (reporting 2.4 million cases in 1989).
4. Green, supra note 3. Some states reported astronomical increases that were well above
the national average. For example, Washington reported an 87/0 increase from 1988 to 1989,
and Nevada reported a 61% increase during the same period. Peterson, supra note 3, at D1.
5. Spencer Rich, Child-Abuse Cases Total 2.4 Million; Advisory Board Laws for Funding
Increase, WASH. POST, June 27, 1990, at A6 (quoting the Report of the United States Advisory
Board on Child Abuse and Neglect).
6. Commentary, UPI, July 11, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (reporting
increased awareness of child abuse in society). Reporting procedures have developed over
time such that now all states have adopted mandatory reporting statutes. See Lorene F.
Schaefer, Comment, Abused Children and State-Created Protection Agencies: A Proposed Section
1988 Standard, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 1419, 1419-20 (1989); Robert J. Shoop & Lynn M. Firestone,
Mandatory Reporting of Suspected Child Abuse: Do Teachers Obey the Law?, 46 Educ. L. Rep.
(West) 1115, 1115-17 (1988).
7. Peterson, supra note 3 (reporting a 10% increase in child abuse in 1989). Furthermore,
greater awareness and modified procedures together cannot be responsible for the reported
three percent increase in deaths resulting from child abuse. Id.; see also Judy Mann, Justice
for Abused Children, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 1990, at C3 (reporting that the number of children
killed increased 360/ between 1985 and 1988 and that more than 1200 children died from
abuse and neglect in 1989).
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Child abuse occurs in many forms:8 physical abuse,9 psycho-
logical abuse, 10 and sexual abuse," all of which cause great harm
to the victim. 12 The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment
Act, 3 enacted by Congress in 1974, defines child abuse as
8. Defining "child abuse" is problematic, Richard J. Gelles, The Social Construction of Child
Abuse, in CHILD ABUSE: COMMISSION AND OMISSION, supra note 1, at 341, 344, because the
definition of the term varies with the person defining it, see JEANETr E W. FARORTH, CHILD
ABUSE AND THE SCHOOL 14-15 (1982) (suggesting that the definition an individual favors
reflects professional objectives); of. Douglas J. Besharov, Child Abuse: Arrest and Prosecution
Decisionmaking, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 315, 368 (1987) (listing 11 forms of child abuse). This
Note uses the term "child abuse" to refer to all forms of abuse suffered by children. The
majority of cases cited in this Note, however, concern the sexual abuse of children.
9. Corporal punishment, defined as nonaccidental physical injury, may be considered child
abuse when the punishment is unreasonable, excessive, and creates a substantial risk of
serious physical harm to the child. Note, Unequal and Inadequate Protection Under the Law:
State Child Abuse Statutes, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 243, 255 (1982); see State v. Rogers, 337
N.E2d 791 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975) (defining corporal to include the entire body, not merely the
trunk). To determine the limits of reasonable punishment, courts weigh the following factors:
the child's age, the body part struck, the instrument used, and the resulting amount of
damage. Brian G. Fraser, A Glance at the Past, a Gaze at the Present, a Glimpse at the
Future: A Critical Analysis of the Development of Child Abuse Reporting Statutes, 54 CHI-
KENT L. REV. 641, 652 n.62 (1977). Educators are permitted to engage in corporal punishment
in all states except Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, and New Jersey. FAIRORTH, supra note
8, at 75-76. In the school context, corporal punishment does not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 683
(1977) (upholding the constitutionality of corporal punishment in schools).
10. See, e.g., Erickson v. Christenson, 781 P.2d 383 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that
plaintiffs claims that pastor mentally manipulated and coerced her to have close contact and
sexual relations with him stated a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress), appeal dismissed, 817 P2d 758 (Or. 1991). Defining psychological abuse is very
difficult, given the many influences on a child's emotions and mental state. See CALAM &
FRANCHI, supra note 2, at 11 (noting the difficulty in developing adequate definitions for
emotional abuse). One senator criticized the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act,
infra note 13, for failing to define mental injury. H.R. REP. No. 685, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11-
12, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2763, 2771-72 (dissenting views of Sen. Landgrebe).
11. Sexual abuse is the most common form of child abuse and reportedly increased 210%
between 1981 and 1986. Mann, supra note 7, at C3. In 1989, child protective services received
374,000 reports of sexual abuse. Id- A British newspaper reported that about 20% of all
child abuse is sexual. Free Speech 1: Sins of the Fathers Visited on the Children, THE
INDEPENDENT, Apr. 28, 1990, at 14. The term "sexual abuse" encompasses a wide array of
behavior, ranging from abuse that does not involve contact (for example, dirty talk or
indecent exposure) to various forms of intercourse and exploitation. KATHLEEN C. FALLER,
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 12-16 (1988) (describing various types of sexual abuse); see also Stephen
Bittner & Eli H. Newberger, Child Abuse: Current Issues of Etiology, Diagnosis and Treatment,
in THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 64, 86 (James S. Henning ed., 1982) (defining types of sexual
contact).
12. CALAM & FRANCHI, supra note 2, at 6, 19-21 listing characteristics of abused children
and discussing long-term effects of child abuse, such as neurological dysfunction, learning
and intelligence deficiencies, poor language skills, and maladjustment to school); HAROLD P.
MARTIN & PATRICIA BEEZLEY, Behavioral Observations of Abused Children, in CHILD ABUSE:
COMMISSION AND OMISSION, supra note 1, at 436-38 (discussing characteristics of abused
children).
13. Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. SS 5101-5107 (1988)).
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"physical or mental injury, sexual abuse or exploitation, negli-
gent treatment, or maltreatment of a child under the age of
eighteen by a person who is responsible for the child's welfare,
under circumstances which indicate that the child's health or
welfare is harmed or threatened thereby."14 As explained in the
legislative history, Congress directed this law to parents, guard-
ians, and other caretakers.15
Child abuse manifests itself at three levels: the home, the
institution, and the public welfare system. 16 The predominant
level is in the home, where children are abused by their care-
takers.17  The next level, the institution, encompasses abuse
committed by adult employees of institutions such as schools,
churches, and hospitals who hold positions that involve authority
and responsibility for children.' s Child abuse at this level arouses
less public concern than abuse in the home, even though the
abusive practices of these public entities are said to be "en-
demic" and "visible to all who care to see."' 9 The third level is
14. 42 U.S.C. S 5106g(4) (emphasis added). Statutory definitions vary from state to state.
Some states define abusers as those in loco parentis, see infra note 42, or more broadly as
anyone in care or control of the child. See State v. Smith, 485 S.W.2d 461, 466-67 (go. Ct.
App. 1972) (noting that the Missouri statute includes both those in care or control of the
child and those standing in oco parentis). Some statutes exclude corporal punishment from
the provisions defining child abuse. See Milton J. Roberts, Annotation, Validity and Construe-
tion of Penal Statute Prohibiting Child Abuse, 1 A.LR.4TH 38, 82 (1980) (collecting cases in
which courts have held reasonable punishment did not violate state statutes).
15. H.R. REP. No. 685, supra note 10, at 5, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2767. By
definition, the term "person who is responsible for the child's welfare" refers to "any
employee of a residential facility" and "any staff person providing out-of-home care." 42
U.S.C. § 5106g(5).
16. David G. Gil, Unraveling Child Abuse, in CHILD ABUSE: Co MISSION AND OMISSION, supra
note 1, at 119, 120-21.
17. Id. at 120. Kathleen C. Faller reports that paternal caretakers commit two-thirds of
all abuse. See FALLER, supra note 11, at 45.
18. Mental health professionals are included in this category: A 1989 survey by T.K. Bait
and K.S. Pope revealed that 100 senior clinical psychologists reported 81 instances of child
abuse by prior therapists and an additional number of unverifiable cases. GERALD P. KOOCHER
& PATRICIA C. KEITH-SPIEGEL, CHILDREN, ETHICS, & THE LAW 76 (1990).
19. Gil, supra note 16, at 122. One need only look at a local newspaper or national television
show to appreciate the enormity of the problem. See, e.g., Russell Chandler, Sex Abuse Cases
Rock the American Clergy, LA. T F s, Aug. 3, 1990, at Al; George Cornell, Lawyer Exhorts
Churches to Screen Child-Care Workers, ARIz. REPUBLIC, Mar. 11, 1989, at C5 (reporting that
over 100 claims were filed against churches by abused children); Paul Duggan, Nurse Indicted
in Abuse of Boys at P.G. Center, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 1991, at A7; Jim George, Priest
Reveals Long History of Sex Abuse, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS DISPATCH, Nov. 6, 1990, at Al
(reporting 20 years of abuse and six lawsuits on sexual misconduct, Nat Hentoff, Child Abuse
in the Schools, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 1988, at A25; Prime Time Live (ABC television broadcast,
June 20, 1991) (reporting results of undercover investigation of a day care center suspected
of abusing and neglecting children).
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societal: it involves the public welfare system and its often
inadequate attempts to provide certain children with nourish-
ment, shelter, education, medical care, and other basic needs
and opportunities.20 Societal abuse, although arguably the most
destructive, receives the least publicity and is less often the
focus in discussions of reform.21
Sadly, the usual perpetrator of abuse is someone the child knows
and trusts;22 case studies reveal that family members commit the
highest percentage of abuse.21 The percentage of abuse attributable
to those outside the family lends itself to error, however, because
the outsider may easily avoid detection by abusing in more subtle
fashions and by threatening the child. Regardless of the actual
figure, the prevalence of child abuse at the institutional level creates
a problem for all of society and not just individual families.2 This
20. Gil, supra note 16, at 122.
21. Id.
22. Mann, supra note 7, at C3. The most common perpetrators of child sexual abuse are
friends or adults known to the child or who share important relationships with the child's
family. Bittner & Newberger, supra note 11, at 87.
23. Case studies of child abuse typically focus on parents, stepparents, aunts, uncles,
grandparents, siblings, cousins, and parents' boyfriends and girlfriends living in the home.
FALLER, supra note 11, at 45; see also CALAM & FRANCHI, supra note 2, at 34-39 (describing
the setting for a study of families of children who had been physically or emotionally abused);
David- Finkelhor, Sexual Abuse of Boys, in RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT 97, 104-06 (Ann W.
Burgess ed., 1985) (reporting that boys are primarily abused by a male parent or relative);
Linda Gordon & Paul O'Keefe, The "Normality" of Incest, in RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT,
supra, at 70, 74 (noting that close blood relatives constitute an overwhelming percentage of
sexual abusers). The second most common perpetrators of abuse are people who are known
to the victim but are not blood relatives. FALLER, supra note 11, at 30-31 (presenting results
of the author's study); see also Ann W. Burgess, Sexual Victimization of Adolescents, in RAPE
AND SEXUAL ASSAULT, supra, at 123, 127-28 (discussing studies on stranger, nonstranger, and
incest assaults).
24. A.L. v. Commonwealth, 521 N.E.2d 1017, 1019 (Mass. 1988) (noting that abuser threat-
ened to molest victim's younger brother if victim reported abuse). Sexual abuse of one form
or another enables the abuser to avoid immediate detection because outward signs of injury
are lacking. See Bittner & Newberger, supra note 11, at 87 (stating that the injury resulting
from sexual abuse is psychological rather than physical); Melissa G. Salten, Note, Statutes of
Limitations in Civil Incest Suits: Preserving the Victim's Remedy, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 189,
194 n.21 (1984) (commenting that the physical violence resulting from incest is limited and
not prone to detection). A victim of sexual abuse may often manifest his injury through
antisocial or delinquent behavior, sleeplessness, difficulty with peers, and problems in school.
FALLER, supra note 11, at 3, 29.
Other factgjs contributing to the inaccuracy of the abuse statistics include the fact that
adults often do not believe children who report abuse, and that social services agencies,
which operate on a perception that parents are the main enemy of children, accuse the
parent first and investigate later. Id. at 5-7 (citing examples of these different reactions).
25. In general, abused children become abusive and dysfunctional adults. Thomas J. Reidy,
The Aggressive Characteristics of Abused and Neglected Children, in CHILD ABUSE: COMMISSION
AND OMISSION, supra note 1, at 471. One author suggests that the lack of an integrated
approach to child abuse prevention by six separate agents compounds the child abuse
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Note addresses the judicial system's response to the institutional
level of child abuse. By discussing reported cases on employee child
abuse,26 this Note analyzes the rationales and arguments for and
against imposing liability on the institution.2
In deciding employee abuse cases, courts may rely on basic tort
principles, employment law, statutes, and constitutional doctrines.
This Note analyzes these established legal doctrines and explores
their applicability in cases of employee abuse. Furthermore, this
Note argues that the difficult and complex nature of employee
abuse cases does not absolve the courts of their responsibility to
protect children28 from the abuse of those in "positions of trust."
One commentator suggested that courts must do "everything pos-
sible" to protect children. In response, this Note suggests that
negligence theories,3  employment law concepts,s statutory and
problem. Gelles, supra note 8, at 346-47. These agents are: medical, social service, criminaljustice, school, neighborhood, and family. Id. Each agent has its own definitions and criteria
as well as a different impact on the suspected abuser. Id. Because all the agents are
responsible for identifying, labeling, treating, and preventing child abuse, an integrated
approach would provide more effective results. Id. at 346-47.
26. Throughout this Note, the terms "employee child abuse" and "employee abuse" refer
to abuse performed by an employee of an institution, organization, or business, occurring at
the place of employment or during the employee's working hours.
27. This Note addresses only the institution's civil liability and assumes that the employee
is guilty of the crime. In order to recover from the institution, the victim must establish the
employee's guilt or wrongdoing. Corleto v. Shore Memorial Hosp., 350 A.2d 534, 536 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975). This Note, however, does not address a victim's standing to sue
the actual abuser for civil remedies. Grounds for recovery in such cases are generally
undisputed and include assault, battery, gross negligence, and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. See generally TERRENCE F. KiELY, MODERN TORT LIABILITY: RECOVERY IN THE
'90s, at 93-96 (1990) (discussing the availability of intentional infliction of emotional distress
theory to the parents and loved ones of the child victim of sexual abuse, and listing the
elements necessary to sustain a cause of action).
This Note does not address the personal liability of the employee's institutional supervisor.
For a collection of cases dealing with this topic, see Annotation, Personal Liability of Public
School Executive or Administrative Officer for Personal Injury or Death of Student, 35
A.LR.4RTH 272 (1985).
28. See Child Sexual Abuse & Our Courts, PR Newswire, July 26, 1990, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Wires File (quoting Pittsburgh attorney Thomas Mulroy, "[N]o matter how
difficult and complicated those case are, the courts must find a way to ... protect our
children."); see also A.L., 521 N.E.2d at 1022-23 (noting that children "cannot easily protect
themselves from adult misbehavior"). Courts should be willing to adapt legal doctrines to
the needs and circumstances of employee abuse cases, because "[tihe protection of a child is
a circumstance which should heighten the standard of care with which a person acts, because
a child is generally unable to protect himself or herself." Schaefer, supra note 6, at 1439.
29. Erickson v. Christenson, 781 P.2d 383, 385 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that a pastor
stands in a position of trust to parishioners), appeal dismissed, 817 P.2d 758 (Or. 1991).
30. Child Seua Abuse & Our Courts, supra note 28.
31. See infra notes 53-75 and accompanying text for a discussion of ordinary negligence
and foreseeability; infra notes 242-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of malpractice.
32. See infra notes 76-142 and accompanying text for a discussion of negligent hiring and
supervision, vicarious liability, and scope of employment.
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constitutional lawa3 strict liability, 4 and public policy35 offer an
established framework upon which courts should build diligently to
decide employee abuse cases in favor of children.
INSTITUTIONS OWE CHILDREN A DUTY OF CARE
Establishing the existence of a duty owed by institutions to children
is necessary to support almost all theories of liability." A victim's
cause of action against an institution arises when an institution
breaches a duty to the victim. Institutions may owe the children in
their care several duties, including a duty of reasonable care,37
33. See infra notes 143-66 and accompanying text for a discussion of the constitutional
right to privacy and the Federal Torts Claims Act.
34. See infra notes 201-12 and accompanying text for a discussion of strict liability.
35. See infra notes 213-95 and accompanying text. Public policy justifications include the
abrogation of former government and charitable immunities, licensure and certification
standards, insurance, risk allocation, and fairness concerns.
36. Courts determine the existence of a duty by reviewing administrative, moral, ethical,
and economic factors; the consequences of establishing a duty; the interests of justice; the
foreseeability of the resulting harm; and the feasibility of preventive measures. KIELY, supra
9note 27, at 291-93; see also Nally v. Grace Community Church, 763 P.2d 948, 956 (Cal. 1988)
(noting that foreseeability of harm, degree of certainty of injury, nexus of defendant's conduct
and injury suffered, moral blame attached to defendant's acts, and policy of preventing future
harm figure in the determination of the existence of a duty), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1007
(1989).
37. See Phyllis P. v. Superior Court, 228 Cal. Rptr. 776, 778 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding that
school breached its duty of reasonable care by failing to notify parent upon school officials'
learning of sexual assault of child).
When an individual acts and then realizes the act created an unreasonable risk of causing
harm, a duty arises to exercise reasonable care to prevent the harm from actually occurring.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 321 (1965); KIELY, supra note 27, at 230. In the employee
abuse situation, institutional actions that might create an unreasonable risk of harm and
potentially subject children to abuse include hiring disturbed employees or pedophiles, failing
to monitor employees responsible for taking care of children, and ignoring reports or rumors
of employee abuse. A duty arises even though the actor may have no reason to believe a
risk exists at the time of the act. Id. at 232. When an employer hires an employee who later
commits child abuse, if the employer at any time realizes the employee's propensities, the
employer has a duty to remedy the prior action and prevent the abuse from occurring. The
failure to do so may generate liability. The same analysis applies to the duty to avoid
creating any unreasonable risk of harm. Id.
Furthermore, undertaking the charge of a helpless individual, such as a child, when one
has no duty to do so subjects the actor to liability for any harm caused by the actor's failure
to use reasonable care to secure the helpless individual's safety while in the actor's care.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra, S 324. In Phyllis P., because the school "covered up"
attacks on the plaintiffs daughter and failed to prevent a subsequent rape, it was potentially
liable to the plaintiff. Phyllis P., 228 Cal. Rptr. at 778. An institution's good faith is irrelevant.
PETER W. HuBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REvOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 35 (1988).
A duty of reasonable care may also arise with respect to an invitee who enters by express
or implied invitation if entry is connected to the owner's business or to an activity the
owner conducts or permits to be conducted, and the owner or the owner and invitee benefit.
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a duty of special care,s a public duty,m a contractual duty to
the child's family,40 and a statutory duty to report suspected
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 827 (6th ed. 1979) (citing Madrazo v. Michaels, 274 N.E.2d 635 (IlM.
App. Ct. 1971)). The owner must protect an invitee from any known or reasonably discoverable
danger and take reasonable measures to make the premises safe. Id. Courts often characterize
students as invitees. Valerie L. Brown, College Fraternities and Sororities: Tort Liability and
the Regulatory Authority of Public Institutions of Higher Education, 58 Educ. L. Rep. (West)
1, 6 (1990). In addition, children attending movie theaters, campgrounds, church functions,
and day care may be invitees. See Community Theatres Co. v. Bentley, 76 S.E.2d 632, 634
(Ga. Ct. App. 1953) (noting that children entering a theater were invitees); see, e.g., Albers
v. Church of the Nazarene, 698 F.2d 852, 855 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that a standard of
ordinary negligence applied when a child was injured on a daycare playground); Applebaum
v. Nemon, 678 S.W.2d 533, 535-36 (Tex. 1984) (noting that a daycare center has b6th an
implied agreement and duty to render aid to a child who becomes imperiled during the
center's custody); Kigin v. Woodmen of the World Ins. Co., 541 N.E.2d 735, 736 (IlK. App. Ct.
1989) (holding that a camp can be liable for the sexual molestation of a camper by one of
the counselors); Annotation, Liability of Youth Camp, Its Agents or Employees, or of Scouting
Leader or Organizatio for Injury to Child Participant in Program, 88 A.LR.3D 1236 (1978).
38. A defendant does not have a duty to protect another from the dangerous propensities
of a third person unless a special relationship exists between the defendant and the victim
or the dangerous person. DeShaney v. Winnebego County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S.
189, 198-200 (1987); Estate of Baily v. County of York, 768 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1985); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 37, § 315; KIELY, supra note 27, at 231. In the institutional
setting, the institution may share a special relationship with both the abuser and the victim:
the abuser is an employee of the institution, and the victim is a dependent in the institution's
care. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 348 (1985); Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment
Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 482-83 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Erickson v. Christenson, 781 P.2d 383, 386-87
(Or. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that pastor has a fidutiary duty to parishomers). But see Bradshaw
v. General Motors Corp., 805 F.2d 110, 111 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that a company's refusal
to rehire a rehabilitated alcoholic employee, in spite of the employer's promises to rehire
once the employee is rehabilitated, does not state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress).
39. The public duty doctrine, inapplicable in cases of ordinary negligence or discretionary
matters, mandates that when the government owes a duty only to the public at large, the
injured private individual has no remedy against the government. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KE TON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 131, at 1049 n.81 (5th ed. 1984). The rationale
behind the doctrine is to avoid interfering with government operations and subjecting
government to financial burdens; courts balance the injured party's right against taxpayer
rights. KIELY, supra note 27, at 156. A government entity is not liable to an individual for
a negligent or wrongful act or omission unless a special relationship exists and the government
owes a duty directly to the injured individual. A.L. v. Commonwealth, 521 N.E.2d 1017, 1026
(Mass. 1988) (Hennessey, C.J., concurring); Stanik v. Beliingham-Watson Dist. Bd. of Health,
737 P.2d 1054 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987); KIELY, supra note 27, at 154. A special relationship
requires prior contact between the government agent and the injured individual and detri-
mental reliance on the relationship by the individual. See, e.g., MARSHALL S. SHAp, THE
DUTY To ACT 79-81 (1977) (discussing government obligations to the public arising from direct
contact with government employers and individual dependence on government actions). Child
abuse prevention acts and other community services may create the necessary special
relationship. See Ebarb v. County of Stanislaus, 246 Cal. Rptr. 845, 848-50 (Ct. App. 1988);
KiELY, supra note 27, at 162.
40. When private institutions are involved, many courts rely on contract principles in
reviewing the institution's obligation to the child and the child's family. Marlene F. v.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:1295
abuse.4' As caretakers of children, institutions assume duties similar
to those of the child's parents via the concept of in loco parenti.4
Specifically, these duties impose on the institution the responsibility
of taking reasonable precautions against foreseeable risks43 and pre-
Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, Inc., 770 P.2d 278 (Cal. 1989) (discussing dual contractual
relationship that arises when both mother and child are patients); Newton v. Kaiser Hosp.,
228 Cal. Rptr. 890 (Ct. App. 1986); Andalon v. Superior Court, 208 Cal. Rptr. 899 (Ct. App.
1984). Courts routinely regulate contracts that affect the public and individual welfare or
that implicate conformity with a professional code of behavior. See HUBER, supra note 37, at
25.
41. Many institutional employees that regularly interact with children have a statutory
duty to report suspected cases of child abuse, no matter when or where the abuse occurred.
See Note, supra note 9, at 256-59; (discussing state statutory requirements relating who must
report and with what level of knowledge); Dental Coalition Formed to Combat Child Abuse,
PR Newswire, Oct. 15, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File (stating that the
failure to report suspected cases may result in fines). Although the laws vary from state to
state, every state has reporting requirements. Frederick K. Lombard et al., Identifying the
Abused Child: A Study of Reporting Practices of Teachers, 63 U. D'r. L. REv. 657, 658 &
nn.6-7 (1986) (citing the reporting statute for each state and the District of Columbia). Some
laws impose a duty on every citizen to report; others require only certain professionals to
report and request that other citizens voluntarily report. Lombard et al., supra at 660-61,
661 n.17; Shoop & Firestone, supra note 6, at 1117. Claims of professional privilege, such as
the doctor-patient and clergy-penitent privileges, are usually invalid. See Mary H. Mitchell,
Must Clergy Tell? Child Abuse Reporting Requirements Versus the Clergy Privilege and Free
Exercise of Religion, 71 MINN. L. REv. 723, 733-34 (1987).
Furthermore, the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act requires states to adopt
reporting statutes, grant immunity to reporters, and develop administrative procedures in
order to be eligible for federal funds. 42 U.S.C. S 5106a(6) (1988). For a general discussion of
reporting standards, see DOUGLAS A. BESHAROV, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT REPORTING AND
INVESTIGATION: POLICY GUIDELINES FOR DECISION MAKING 9 (1988).
Mandatory reporting laws create a duty, and "[n]ot reporting child abuse is a form of
abuse." Roy Horowitz & Susan Duff, Family Clinic: Inappropriate Corporal Punishment,
NEWSDAY, Mar. 17, 1990, pt. 11, at 2; see also Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs.,
649 F.2d 134, 146 (2d Cir. 1981) (failing to comply with statute warrants liability and amounts
to deliberate indifference). In many cases, the reporting of the abuse is the child's only hope.
The knowing failure to report abuse subjects the institution or individual to criminal and
civil penalties. Reports made in good faith remain immune from liability. Note, supra note
9, at 262-63. If a required reporter is immune from liability, immunity also extends to the
reporter's employer. Cream v. Mitchell, 264 Cal. Rptr. 876, 883 (Ct. App. 1989).
42. KIELY, supra note 27, at 222. The institutions are said to be in loco parentis, which
means that they stand in place of the parent and are charged with the parent's rights,
duties, and responsibilities. See Cornhusker Christian Children's Home, Inc. v. Department
of Social Servs., 416 N.W.2d 551, 560-61 (Neb. 1987) (citing Austin v. Austin, 22 N.W.2d 560,
563 (Neb. 1946) (defining the in loco parentis relationship)), appeal dismissed, 488 U.S. 919
(1988); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 708 (6th ed. 1990).
Schools have long been the most important nonparental caretakers of children over five
years old. In recent years, kindergartens, preschools, and nursery schools have become
increasingly prominent caretakers of children aged three to five years, and 90% of 6- through
13-year-olds attend public school. Mary Jo Bane et al., Child Care Settings in the United
States, in CHILD CARE AND MEDIATING STRUCTURES 18, 23, 31 (Brigitte Berger & Sidney
Callahan eds., 1979).
43. Fazzolari v. Portland Sch. Dist. No. 1J, 734 P.2d 1326, 1337 (Or. 1987) (describing the
special relationship of school toward student).
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venting employees from intentionally harming others.4 This imposi-
tion does not unduly burden an institution's operation and is consistent
with the philosophy that children require a heightened duty of care.
Breach of Duty
Employee abuse of a child in the care of an institution consti-
tutes two separate breaches of duty: the employee's abusive
action is a breach of his duty to obey the law that ultimately
subjects the employee to criminal penalties,46 and the institution's
failure to meet any of the above listed duties is a breach for
which the institution may be civilly liable for failing to protect
the child.47 Generally, a breach of duty is grounds for liability
through, for example, negligence48 or reliance principles. 49 In the
area of employee abuse, the judicial system's failure to impose
liability on the institution appears to condone the institution's
breach of duty and ignores the general ethical duty and specific
legal duties of care imposed on the institution.50
EMPLOYEE CHILD ABUSE AND THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE
Even if a court finds that an institution owed a duty to the
victim of child abuse, the institution often escapes liability through
44. Kigin v. Woodmen of the World Ins. Co., 541 N.E.2d 735, 736 (IIl. App. Ct. 1989)
(reinstating cause of action against campground for neglecting its duty to exercise reasonable
care to control employee and prevent him from intentionally harming child).
45. See Di Cosala v. Kay, 450 A.2d 508, 519 (N.J. 1982) (recognizing that children require
a higher degree of care than adults). Furthermore, according to the U.S. Advisory Board on
Child Abuse and Neglect, a general ethical duty is shared by everyone to ensure the safety
and well-being of children. Marlene Cimons, Panel Calls Child Abuse a National Emergency,
L.A. TmEs, June 27, 1990, at A12 (quoting 1990 Report of the U.S. Advisory Board on Child
Abuse and Neglect).
46. Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, Inc., 770 P.2d 278 (Cal. 1989).
47. Hipp v. Hospital Auth., 121 S.E.2d 273, 275 (Ga. Ct. App. 1961) (breaching the duty to
select only competent employees exposes the institution to liability for any assaults committed
by the employee).
48. A negligence action may arise when an institution's failure to act jeopardizes a victim,
which then may be compounded by a failure to protect. Lisa E. Heinzerling, Comment,
Actionable Inaction, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 1048, 1062 (1986) (citing White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d
381, 384 (7th Cir. 1979), affd sub nom. Ellsworth v. Racine, 774 F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1985)).
49. Courts may impose liability when the victim or his parents "detrimentally relied" upon
the defendant in an appropriate manner. See P.L.C. v. Housing Auth., 588 F. Supp. 961, 965-
66 (WiD. Pa. 1984) (finding housing authority liable for groundskeeper's sexual assault on
tenant who justifiably relied on company for safety). Failure to prove detrimental reliance
should not bar liability because geography and economics usually limit a family's choice
about which school, church, or hospital the child attends. Fazzolari v. Portland Sch. Dist. No.
1J, 734 P.2d 1326, 1337 (Or. 1987).
50. See supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of the duties imposed
on institution.
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certain legal doctrines. 51 Because child abusers often choose oc-
cupations that involve interaction with children,2 courts should
acknowledge the prevalence of employee abuse and resolve to
correct the situation instead of routinely and flatly dismissing
victim's claims. No doubt public institutions need protection and
that increased liability potentially undermines the institutions'
ability to provide necessary community services. Conversely,
however, the continual denial of liability in employee abuse cases
insulates culpable institutions from their responsibilities and bur-
dens the community by allowing irresponsible institutions to
continue to operate. Furthermore, protecting such institutions
subjugates the rights and well-being of children. The following
discussion of grounds for institutional liability attempts to balance
the interests of the institution against the rights of the abused
child, while ensuring compensation for the victims of employee
abuse.
Tort Concepts: Employee Abuse is Reasonably Foreseeable and
Institutional Failure to Prevent Harm Constitutes Negligence
In negligence actions, a plaintiff may recover for an injury
caused by a breach of duty. 3 Generally, institutions must meet
a reasonable standard of behavior,54 and the injured child must
51. Specifically, these doctrines are lack of deliberate indifference, unforeseeability, per-
sonal acts beyond scope of employment, sovereign immunity, and charitable immunity. See
infra text accompanying notes 57-75, 112-16, 167-200.
52. FALLER, supra note 11, at 86. Consider the following statement by a Chicago police
officer:
Whenever somebody says, "Gosh, did you hear about that schoolteacher, that
priest, that camp counselor who abused the kid?"-it doesn't surprise me. I
eaxpect it. These people learn early, usually at puberty, that they like kids. Now
they have a career choice to make. They're not gonna choose to be, say, a
lumberjack. If they're smart in school, they'll become a teacher, a priest, a
youth counselor. If they're not so smart, they may become a school janitor or
the camp groundskeeper. They know they want access to kids, and they pick
a profession deliberately.
Connie Fletcher, What Cops Could Tell You About Crimes Against Women, GLAMOUR, Jan.
1991, at 179.
53. KEETON ET AL., supra note 39, S 30, at 164-65; see also A.L. v. Commonwealth, 521
N.E.2d 1017, 1020 (Mass. 1988) (listing breach of duty as.necessary to a claim of negligence).
Modifications of traditional negligence principles have resulted in causes of action such as
negligent security (a failure to provide adequate protection, as in the case of a tenant raped
by an employee of the landlord, or the commission of crimes by a paroled prisoner) and
negligent entrustment (entrustment of a person or instrument that creates an unreasonable
risk of harm). Although beyond the scope of this Note, these alternative grounds provide
viable grounds for imposing liability as well.
54. The concept of "reasonableness" is measured against the conduct of a reasonable
person of ordinary prudence in the community. KEETON ET AL., supra note 39, S 32, at 174.
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prove that the institution's lack of care caused the actual harm.55
An abused child recovers by proving proximate cause, that is,
that the harm the child suffered was a direct result of some
institutional action, such as offering services to the victim, hiring
the employee, or failing to adequately supervise the employee.0
After establishing causation, the victim must prove that the
institution knew, or should have known, of the risk of harm;
that the institution displayed deliberate indifference to the
potential for employee abuse;57 or that the resulting abuse was
reasonably foreseeable. 58 Although some argue that institutions
55. Recovery in negligence is conditioned upon proving causation, that is, a connection
between the institution's act or omission and the resulting injury. Id. § 41, at 263.
56. Institutions often counterargue that the actual cause of harm is an act by the employee,
which severs the causal connection and relieves the institution of liability. See Copithorne v.
Framingham Union Hosp., 520 N.E.2d 139, 141 (Mass. 1988); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF ToRs, supra note 37, % 440, 441 (defining a superceding cause as "an act of a third
person or other force which by its intervention prevents the actor from being liable for
harm to another which his antecedent negligence is a substantial factor in bringing about'
and an intervening force as a force "which actively operates in producing harm to another
after the actor's negligent act or omission has been committed").
Such arguments are not successful when the institution's actions either created or increased
the risk that the intervening force would produce harm. A.L., 521 N.E.2d at 1022; Mount
Zion State Bank & Trust v. Central Ill. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church,
556 N.E.2d 1270, 1273 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 564 N.E.2d 839 (Ill. 1990) Additionally,
institutions are liable when the intervening force is foreseeable and precautionary measures
might have averted the harm. A.L., 521 N.E.2d at 1022. Although the institution cannot be
held liable for unanticipated abuse, liability is justly imposed for any foreseeable intervening
causes or for the failure to take reasonable precautions.
57. To establish an institution's knowledge of or deliberate indifference to child abuse
occurring within the institution, a victim must prove that after the institution received notice
of several violations forming a pattern of abuse, the institution deliberately ignored or tacitly
authorized the violations and failed to take remedial steps, resulting in further injuries. Doe
v. Special Sch. Dist., 901 F.2d 642, 645 (8th Cir. 1990). The court must determine whether
the actions of the institution amounted to reckless disregard or gross negligence of the
child's constitutional rights. D.T. v. Independent Sch. Dist., 894 F.2d 1176, 1193 (10th Cir.),
cert. deniAl, 111 S. Ct. 213 (1990h see also Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 649
F.2d 134, 141 (2d Cir. 1981) (refusing to hold Department of Social Services liable for sexual
abuse in foster home unless plaintiff proved "deliberate indifference" to child's placement-
proof of mere negligence, indifference, or inaction was insufficient). The court must also
consider whether the institution responded according to "official policy," and if so, whether
the policy ignored repeated and frequent abusive actions. Special Sch. Dist, 901 F2d at 645;
Spann v. Tyler Indep. Sch. Dist., 876 F.2d 437, 438-39 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied 493 U.S.
1043 (1990).
58. The test of foreseeability is whether the consequences are within the scope of the
original risk. See Ponticas v. K.M.S. Invs., 331 N.W2d 907, 912 (Minn. 1983); Sally G. v.
Orange Glen Estates Homeowners, 227 Cal. Rptr. 559, 563 (Ct. App. 1986); Clark Equip. Co.
v. Wheat, 154 Cal. Rptr. 874, 883-84 (Ct. App. 1979). This foreseeability standard differs from
the usual negligence standard of considering the prudent person's response to a certain
situation. KIELY, supra note 27, at 35.
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are not insurers of child safety, 9 no one disputes that institu-
tions are required to use at least reasonable care for the pro-
tection of children.60 Courts are understandably reluctant to
impose on institutions the burden of suspecting arguably im-
probable occurrences. By requiring a standard of knowledge
that is too high, however, courts permit institutions to ignore
the problem. 61
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit applied the knowledge standard in D.T. v. Independent
School District.2 In D.T., the school board hired a teacher with
a prior sodomy conviction and took no action against the teacher
after one report and several allegations of molestation. 63 The
court held that the evidence was insufficient to find that the
school board was deliberately indifferent to the subsequent
abuse of three children.64 At trial, the children failed to prove
a "direct causal connection" between the board's actions and
the abuse.65 As a result, the court refused to impose liability
absent any proof that the school sponsored or encouraged the
teacher's actions. 66
Such high knowledge standards are unrealistic. First, no in-
stitution publicly recognizes child abuse as an official policy nor
sanctions, orders, or participates in employee abuse. Hence, this
standard relieves all but the most culpable and knowledgeable
59. See Congleton v. Starlite Skate Ctr., Inc., 333 S.E.2d 677, 680 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985);
Antley v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 539 So. 2d 696, 705 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (citing Williams v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 268 So. 2d 290, 291-92 (La. Ct. App. 1972)); Bonnet v. Slaughter, 422 So. 2d
499, 501-02 (La. Ct. App. 1982); Prier v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 351 So. 2d 265, 268 (La. Ct.
App. 1977).
60. Bonnet, 422 So. 2d at 502; see A.L., 521 N.E.2d at 1021-23. See generally Cornhusker
Christian Children's Home v. Department of Social Servs., 416 N.W.2d 551, 560 (Neb. 1987),
appeal dismissed, 488 U.S. 919 (1988) (noting that a child care agency stands in loco parentis
to the children under its care).
61. For instance, in Community Theatres Co. v. Bentley, 76 S.E.2d 632 (Ga. Ct. App. 1953),
a theater manager abused at least two boys for several months. In that case, the manager
committed a minimum of 13 attacks on at least two boys in the basement of the theater on
a mat unrelated to the business of projecting and showing movies. Id. at 633. The court
held the theater had no reason to suspect its employee of child abuse and that the victim's
failure to prove that the company had actual notice of the abuse absolved the company of
liability. Id. at 634; see also Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Sharara, 307 S.E.2d 129, 130-31
(Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (rejecting plaintiffs argument that employer knowledge of employee
marital problems was sufficient to impose liability on employer for attack).
62. 894 F.2d 1176 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 213 (1990).
63. Id. at 1192-93.
64. Id. at 1193.
65. Id. at 1188.
66. Id. at 1191.
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employer.6 7 Furthermore, the lack of a deliberate indifference
standard is too high for child abuse cases. Given the amount
and extent of the harm that results and the fact that the victim
is a defenseless child, a standard of mere indifference would
be preferable. Such a standard would not unfairly impose lia-
bility on the truly ignorant institution but would hold respon-
sible the institutions that ignored the situation.
Other courts require that the employee abuse be reasonably
foreseeable. The only risks from which an institution must
protect itself are those that are certain to happen during the
operation of the employer's business.68 The generally foreseeable
consequences of the business endeavor determine whether the
risks are created by the institution or are inherent in its op-
erations. 69 In the context of employment practices, courts con-
strue foreseeability by determining whether the act is "so unusual
or startling that it would seem unfair to include the loss re-
sulting from it among other costs of the employer's business."70
Rarely, however, do courts find employee abuse to be "anything
other than highly unusual and very startling."7' 1
Upon finding that the abuse amounts to unusual and startling
actions and is thus unforeseeable, courts then excuse the insti-
tution.7 2 Such reasoning ignores the increasing prevalence of
child abuse.73 Because employee abuse is not infrequent, requir-
ing institutions to anticipate such abuse is reasonable. In addi-
tion, because employers in nonchildcare fields are forced to
67. Liability depends upon the degree to which officials demonstrate knowledge, acquies-
cence, support, and encouragement of child abuse. Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist.,
882 F.2d 720, 729 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing Commonwealth v. Porter, 659 F.2d 306, 321 (3d Cir.
1981)), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1044 (1990); see A.L. v. Commonwealth, 521 N.E.2d 1017, 1017
(Mass. 1988); Cream v. Mitchell, 264 Cal. Rptr. 876, 879 (Ct. App. 1989).
68. Alma W. v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 176 Cal. Rptr. 287, 293 (Ct. App. 1981).
69. Id. at 291 (citing Rodgers v. Kemper Constr. Co., 124 Cal. Rptr. 143, 149 (Ct. App.
1975)).
70. Id. See also infra note 101 for a discussion of risk spreading.
71. Alma W., 176 Cal. Rptr. at 292 (finding school janitor's abuse during school hours and
on school premises per se highly unusual and very startling).
72. See Jeffrey Scott E. v. Central Baptist Church, 243 Cal. Rptr. 128, 132 (Ct. App. 1988)
(holding church not liable for Sunday school teacher's unforeseeable and self-serving sexual
assault); Milla v. Tamayo, 232 Cal. Rptr. 685, 690 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding church not liable
for priests' sexual acts with minor because acts were "uncharacteristic of church," unfore-
seeable, and not ratified by archbishop).
73. Interestingly, one educator stated: 'The injury to students by acts of commission or
omission by school personnel is not unusual:' Bruce Beezer, School District Liability for
Negligent Hiring and Retention of Unfit Employees, 56 Educ. L. Rep. (West) 1117, 1117 (1990).
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include unlikely occurrences in their cost of doing business,74
such a requirement for institutions that provide services to
children is not too burdensome. The unfairness argument is
shortsighted also because the courts fail to weigh the great
harm to the victim against the small burden to the institution.
Simply stated, the employer is in the best position and has the
best opportunity to prevent the harm and may include any
liability in the cost of doing business. 75
Employment Law Concepts: Institutions Must Employ
Competent Personnel and Assume Responsibility for Employee
Actions
As discussed previously, institutions undertaking the care of
children may owe several duties to the children and their par-
ents, the breach of which gives rise to actionable claims against
the institution.76 A victim of employee child abuse also may
have a claim arising out of the employment relationship between
the institution and the abuser. A victim of employee abuse may
recover by proving that the institution knowingly hired an
incompetent employee or failed to adequately supervise its em-
ployees.77 Alternatively, a victim may base a claim on vicarious
liability principles if he is able to prove that the employee acted
within the "scope of his employment. 78
Traditionally, courts interpret the elements of negligent hir-
ing and vicarious liability actions strictly; as a result, most
employee abuse cases fail.79 The judiciary is not wrong in up-
holding the valid, albeit arguable, point that employers cannot
be faulted for every act that occurs during the workday. Blindly
applying traditional employment law concepts, however, ignores
the fact that the institutions assumed greater than usual em-
74. For example, storeowners may be liable for injuries that occur on their premises. See
generally Lloyd v. S.S. Kresge Co., 270 N.W.2d 423, 426 (Wis. Ct. App. 1978) (noting that
the duty of the storeowner to render aid to customers is a cost of doing business); Senan
E. Green, Note, Judicial Efforts to Redirect an Errant Statute: Civil RICO and the Misappli-
cations of Vicarious Corporate Liability, 65 B.U. L. REv. 561, 602 (1985) (stating that a
corporation can pass on the costs if held liable for employee negligence).
75. Green, supra note 74, at 599.
76. See supra notes 37-45 and accompanying text for the various duties that an institution
may owe to a child.
77. See supra note 37 and accompanying text for a discussion of the duty of reasonable
care.
78. See infra note 113 and accompanying text for a definition of "scope of employment".
79. See, e.g., Alma W. v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 176 Cal. Rptr. 287, 289 (Ct. App. 1981)
(holding that a school district was not liable for a janitor's sexual assault of a student).
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ployer responsibilities and additional obligations by undertaking
child care functions.80 Accordingly, more flexible interpretations
of negligent hiring and vicarious liability concepts provide a
means for the institution to retain the protection due an em-
ployer while ensuring that the institution maintains its duties
and obligations to the children entrusted in its care.
Negligent Hiring and Supervision
Parents generally do not have the power to hire and fire the
specific employee who cares for their child8' and, therefore, rely
heavily on the institution to hire appropriate personnel. This
reliance permits a cause of action in negligent hiring when the
institution fails to exercise the requisite care in selecting and
hiring employees and in determining the employee's compe-
tency.8 2 After hiring, employers must supervise employees prop-
erly; failure to remove incompetent employees subjects an
institution to negligent supervision claims.83 Fundamentally, neg-
ligent hiring and supervision create causes of action when the
institution knowingly8 4. hires or supervises an inadequate and
harmful employee 85 or otherwise unreasonably creates a forsee-
able risk to a protected interest.86 A negligent hiring claim may
80. See supra note 42 (discussing institutions' responsibilities in loco parentis).
81. A.L. v. Commonwealth, 521 N.E.2d 1017, 1022-23 (Mass. 1988).
82. Hipp v. Hospital Auth., 121 S.E.2d 273, 275 (Ga. Ct. App. 1961); see Beezer, supra note
73, at 1118. To prove a prima fade case of negligent hiring, the plaintiff must allege the
existence of an employment relationship, the employee's unfitness, that the employer knew
or should have known of the unfitness, and causation. Sharon S. Howard, Negligent Hiring
and Employer Liability in the Selection of Employees, 49 Educ. L. Rep. (West) 1, 3 (1988). A
negligent retention action may arise when the employee is retained after the employer is
aware of the person's unsuitability for the job. Id. at 2; see also KIELY, supra note 27, at
269-70 (noting that a failure to conduct a background check may give rise to a negligent
retention action). "Incompetence" or "unfitness" is defined as drinking on the job, physical
or mental problems, viciousness, recklessness, or any other conduct that would provide a
reasonable employer with notice of the employee's unfitness and likelihood of producing
harm. Cindy M. Haerle, Minnesota Developments, Employer Liability for the Criminal Acts
of Employees Under Negligent Hiring Theory: Ponticas v. K.M.S. Investments, 68 MINN. L.
REV. 1303, 131142 (1984); Howard, supra, at 3.
83. Corleto v. Shore Memorial Hosp., 350 A.2d 534, 538 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975).
In some cases, however, government employees are not easily removed because immunity
doctrines prohibit termination. See Upton v. Thompson, 930 F.2d 1209, 1211-13 (7th Cir. 1991).
84. The term "knowingly" includes instances when the institution acts without actual
knowledge, but when it should have known that the employee was dangerous or inept.
85. Howard, supra note 82, at 2. The applicable foreseeability standard requires only that
a general zone of risk is apparent, as opposed to an actual forecasting of the particular harm.
Di Cosala v. Kay, 450 A.2d 508, 517 (N.J. 1982).
86. See Fazzolari v. Portland Sch. Dist. No. 1J, 734 P.2d 1326, 1336 (Or. 1987), appeal
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result from employee negligence or from the employee's com-
mission of a criminal offense.87
The duty of reasonable care discussed previously 8 applies
even more so in the employment setting because of the fact
that the parties met through the employment 9 As long as the
plaintiff and the employee each were in a rightful place and
met as a direct consequence of the employment, then the em-
ployer must reasonably ensure the safety and welfare of those
who come into contact with the employee. 90 This obligation
applies even to willful or criminal injuries. 91
Because the institution's liability for employee abuse depends
on the fact of employment 92 and on how much the employer
knows and how much the employer should know,93 the institution
should evaluate the risk of hiring an unfit employee and then
determine the extent to which it must investigate the employ-
ee's background. The test is whether the employer conducted a
dismissed, 817 P.2d 758 (Or. 1991); Erickson v. Christenson, 781 P .2d 383, 386 (Or. Ct. App.
1989), appeal dismissed, 817 P.2d 758 (Or. 1991); Haerle, supra note 82, at 1305-07. Foresee-
ability is determined on the basis of duties that are characteristic, required, or incidental to
an employee's position. KIELY, supra note 27, at 290-91.
87. J. v. Victory Tabernacle Baptist Church, 372 S.E.2d 391, 394 (Va. 1988).
88. See supra note 37.
89. Beezer, supra note 73, at 1118.
90. k&; see a/so Ponticas v. K.M.S. Invs., 331 N.W.2d 907, 911 (Minn. 1983) (stating that
"an employer has the duty to exercise reasonable care. . . in hiring individuals who, because
of the employment, may pose a threat of injury to members of the public").
91. Beezer, supra note 73, at 1119.
92. Contrast this with a negligent entrustment action, which does not require an employ-
ment relationship and is premised on the entrustment of a dangerous chattel to a third
party, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 37, S 405, or the entrustment of a
reasonably safe chattel to a third party who is likely to use it in a manner creating an
unreasonable risk of harm, id. S 390. Such a cause of action may be helpful when the abuse
is committed by someone other than an employee (thus negating the possibility of negligent
hiring/supervising actions). For instance, in Blanca C. v. County of Nassau, 480 N.Y.S.2d 747
(App. Div. 1984), aFfd, 481 N.E.2d 545 (N.Y. 1985), the court found that the social services
unit could not be liable for the abuse committed by foster parents, because no employment
relationship existed between the unit and the parents. Id. at 750. As a result, the court
dismissed the vicarious liability, id., negligent selection, id. at 752, and supervision claims,
id-
For further contrast, see the discussion infra notes 99-111 and accompanying text on
vicarious liability, which requires the plaintiff to prove the harm came from within the scope
of employment. In negligent hiring, the plaintiff need not meet the strict scope of employment
standards. Howard, supra note 82, at 3. For other differences between vicarious liability and
negligent hiring, see Haerle, supra note 82, at 1307 n.22.
93. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. Interestingly, evidence of the employee's
prior acts is admissible at trial, generally resulting in greater recovery for the plaintiff. See,
e.g., Ponticas, 331 N.W.2d at 914 (stating that the jury considered evidence of the employee's
criminal record).
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reasonable investigation 94 given the level of risk involved in the
position.95 Careful and thorough employee screening in almost
every case provides the institution with information regarding
the employee's suitability to care for children.9 An institution
may conduct background checks by utilizing electronic databases 97
or by calling previous employers and following up even the
slightest intimation of unfitness. Such measures do not seem
unduly burdensome considering the harm that may be prevented
and the extent of the risk involved.98
94. Reasonableness depends on the job position and the surrounding circumstances. For
instance, although it is reasonable for a new tavern owner to retain employees hired by a
previous owner, Evans v. Morsell, 395 A2d 480, 484-85 (Md. 1978), it is not reasonable to
hire employees only on the basis of whether previous employers answer "ok" or "not ok" in
a telephone reference check, Easly v. Apollo Detective Agency, Inc., 387 N.E,2d 1241, 1244-
49 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979). To fail to check an applicant's criminal record, past employment
history, and references when the position involves the safety and welfare of others is also
unreasonable. Ponticas, 331 N.W.2d at 914-15.
95. Ponticas, 331 N.W.2d at 911. Employee unfitness is determined by the circumstances
of employment and the sensitivity of the occupation. See Kendall v. Gore Properties, Inc.,
236 F.2d 673, 678 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (distinguishing between "a yard man, not ordinarily to be
sent into a tenant's apartment" and an employee "sent, after hours, to work for protracted
periods in the apartment of a young women tenant living alone"); Welsh Mfg. v. Pinkerton's,
Inc., 474 A.2d 436, 440-41 (R.I. 1984) (holding that an employer providing security guards
must scrutinize the employee's background with particular care).
96. See J. v. Victory Tabernacle Baptist Church, 372 SE.2d 391, 392 (Va. 1988) (holding an
employer liable for negligent hiring because the employer should have known that the
employee had a history of sexual assault on children). The concern that an overly thorough
search or a refusal to hire may lead to a defamation or an employment discrimination claim
should not be ignored. See Therapist Libeled, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 6, 1989, at 6 (reporting that a
jury awarded three million dollars to a therapist accused of child abuse by her employer).
Institutions, however, may attempt to justify such actions using truth and good faith defenses.
See, e.g., Parker v. Williams, 855 F.2d 763, 772-73 (11th Cir. 1988) (rejecting employer's good
faith defense); Ramirez v. Rogers, 540 A.2d 475, 477 (Me. 1988) (noting that the burden is on
the defendant to prove truth defense); Davis v. Durham City Schs., 372 S.E.2d 318, 320 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1988) (finding no liability for good faith report of abuse).
97. Although a national database is not currently operational, federal legislation appears
ready to correct the situation. See Sharon Shahid & Karen Thomas, Child Abuse: "Big Secret
of Shane," USA TODAY, Nov. 13, 1991, at A13 (discussing the proposed National Child
Protection Act). Under the bill, states must register the names and social security numbers
of convicted child abusers with the Justice Department. Institutions may then contact the
Department before hiring child care employees. Oprah Seeks Data Bank on Child Abusers,
WAsH. TmEs, Nov. 13, 1991, at A2. Interestingly, as of 1982, central registries recording
child abuse victins existed in 47 states. See Note, supra note 9, at 265 & nn.189-91.
98. Given that child safety is at issue, expecting institutions to be extra careful in selecting
employees is not unreasonable. Cf D.T. v. Independent Sch. Dist., 894 F.2d 1176 (10th Cir.)
(stating that principal ignored rumors and allegations of previous molestation against teacher
later convicted on three counts of sexual molestation in principal's school), cert. denied, 111
S. Ct. 213 (1990). At the very least, an institution must follow its own standard operating
procedures on hiring or be prepared to suffer the consequences. In Infant C., the Boy Scout
organization failed to properly process a troop leader application and conducted an inadequate
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Vicarious Liability
Vicarious liability 99 imputes negligence or fault of an employee
to the employer based on the fact that the employee is acting
on behalf of the employer. 100 The rationale is that the employer
controls the employee; selects, trains, and trusts the employee;
has the opportunity to prevent the employee's acts; and also
has greater resources. 10 The employer may be liable even though
the employee received specific orders from the employer to use
due care. 0 2 An employer must expect the imposition of liability
for any negligent, willful, malicious, or criminal acts committed
within the course of employment or in furtherance of the insti-
tution's business.103 Although intentional torts are never per se
authorized, courts are willing to find that certain torts are so
reasonably connected with the employment that liability is un-
hesitatingly imposed. 0 4 Additionally, employers are responsible
for the employee's commission of personal acts of a foreseeable
nature. 05
Before a court may impute any fault to the employer, it must
first determine the employee's guilt. 0 6 Next, the following cir-
cumstances are evaluated: whether the employee acted within
investigation that failed to reveal the applicant's previous dismissal from a troop for molesting
scouts. Infant C. v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 391 S.E.2d 322, 324-25 (Va. 1990); see also
Andrews v. United States, 732 F.2d 366, 368 (4th Cir. 1984) (opining that the officers could
have averted the harm through proper supervision and investigation).
99. This concept is generally referred to as respondeat superior. WiLLiAm L. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 458 (4th ed. 1971).
100. In the following discussion of vicarious liability, hospitals are not considered liable
for the negligence of doctors who provide services to the hospital as independent contractors
and not as hospital employees. Corleto v. Shore Memorial Hosp., 350 A.2d 534, 536 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975).
101. PROSSER, supra note 99, at 459. Also, in applying vicarious liability, courts consider
the ability of the institution to allocate the risk by redistributing the costs of liability to
consumers of the employer's goods and services. See Haerle, supra note 82, at 1304-05. Such
liability gives the employer an incentive to take precautions and provide instruction and
supervision. Id
102. PROSSER, supra note 99, at 461.
103. KiELY, supra note 27, at 33. The fundamental question is whether the employee acted
"in part by a purpose to further the business." Id. An employer may be liable for the
employee's misguided purpose of furthering the business. PROSSER, supra note 99, at 464-65.
104. PROSSER, supra note 99, at 464-65; see also Gregor v. Kleiser, 443 N.E.2d 1162, 1166
(Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (holding that an employer who granted an employee authority to maintain
order with force was liable, for assault).
105. PROSSER, supra note 99, at 462-63.
106. Corleto v. Shore Mem6rial Hosp., 350 A.2d 534, 536 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975);
see supra note 27.
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the scope of employment;0 7 whether the conduct mirrored the
general kind of work the employee usually performed; 10 8 whether
the conduct occurred within the hours and physical area of
employment;0 9 whether service to the employer's interests mo-
tivated the employee;" 0 and whether the employer controlled
and supervised the employee."'
Scope of Employment
Any acts performed within the scope of employment, even
criminal acts, may subject the employer to liability."2 Scope of
employment "refers to those acts which are so closely connected
with what the servant is employed to do, and so fairly and
reasonably incidental to it, that they may be regarded as meth-
ods, even though quite improper ones, of carrying out the
objectives of the employment."" 3 An institution is not liable for
torts committed outside the scope of employment unless the
following criteria are met: the employer intended the act or the
results;"4 the employer was negligent or reckless;"15 or the
employee purported to act as the employer's agent." 6
In light of the current trend extending employer responsibility
to intentional torts reasonably connected with the employ-
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY S 219 (1957). Determining the scope of employment
is usually a question of fact for the jury. Randi F. v. High Ridge YMCA, 524 N.E.2d 966,
968 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988). In doing so, the jury must consider whether the institution could
expect the abuse. Id. at 970.
108. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra note 107, S 228.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at S 220; see Malloy v. Fong, 232 P.2d 241, 249-50 (Cal. 1951) (analyzing the
presbytery's degree of control and supervision over its ministers). In Cordts v. Boy Scouts of
America, the court simplified the test into two parts: (1) whether the conduct was required
or incidental to employment and (2) whether the supervisor may reasonably have foreseen
the conduct. 252 Cal. Rptr. 629, 631 (Ct. App. 1989).
112. Randi F. v. High Ridge YMCA, 524 N.E.2d 966, 968 (I. App. Ct. 1988).
113. Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053, 1056 (Utah 1989) (quoting KEETON ET
AL., supra note 39, S 70, at 502). Factors to be considered include:
the time, place and purpose of the act, and its similarity to what is authorized;
whether it is one commonly done by such servants; the extent of departure
from normal methods; the previous relations between the parties; whether the
master had reason to expect that such an act would be done; and many other
considerations.
KEETON ET AL., supra note 39, S 70, at 502.
114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra note 107, S 219.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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ment, 117 the extension of the scope of employment concept to
include any employee action that affects the children seems
appropriate, given the purpose and nature of the institutions
involved in employee abuse cases. The courts, however, find it
difficult, if not impossible, to find child abuse within the scope
of employment,118 using narrow and literal constructions of the
purpose and function of the institution to avoid imposing liabil-
ity. 1" 9
The strict interpretation approach ignores the fact that the
purpose of the employment is to care for children; any employee
action while caring for children arguably falls within the scope
of employment. 120 Additionally, an institution may be liable for
entirely personal ends of an employee when the institution owes
a duty to the victim.1 21 Given the direct duty the institution
owes to the child and the magnitude of that duty,22 courts
should not allow the institution to avoid liability.
Recognizing that child beatings, rapes, and molestation could
never meet any strict scope of employment test, courts should
develop alternative rationales or widen the application of the
scope doctrine. Instead of holding that the employee's actions
fell outside the scope of employment because the acts committed
did not serve the employer, the courts could find that the
employee abused the position of employment and therefore acted
within the scope of employment. 23 The applicable test should
117. PROSSER, supra note 99, at 464. The tendency developed as a result of applying
allocation of the risk theories. Id. at 459.
118. See Kimberly M. v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 263 Cal. Rptr. 612 (Ct. App. 1989)
(determining that the school district was not liable for teacher's sexual misconduct); Jeffrey
Scott E. v. Central Baptist Church, 243 Cal. Rptr. 128 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the
church was not liable for sexual assault because Sunday school teacher's acts were inde-
pendent, self-serving, and unrelated to church activities); Milla v. Tamayo, 232 Cal. Rptr. 685
(Ct. App. 1986) (holding the church not liable for priests' sexual acts with minor because
such acts were uncharacteristic of a priest).
119. See Doe v. City of Mount Vernon, 548 N.Y.S.2d 282 (App. Div. 1989) (holding that
city was not a child caring agency and thus owed no duty to children sexually abused at a
day care center); Blanca C. v. County of Nassau, 480 N.Y.S.2d 747 (App. Div. 1984) (holding
social services department not liable for sexual abuse committed by foster parents), afl'd,
481 N.E.2d 545 (N.Y. 1985).
120. If an institution assumes the duty to take charge of the child, then the institution
should assume responsibility for beth the child's care and any mistreatment.
121. PROSSER, supra note 99, at 465.
122. See supra notes 45, 98 and accompanying text.
123. See Erickson v. Christenson, 781 P2d 383 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that a pastor
who had sexual relations with a churchgoer abused their confidential relationship and was
acting within the scope of his employment), appeal dismissed, 817 P2d 758 (Or. 1991); see
also Gaston v. Becker, 314 N.W.2d 728 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981). In Gaston, the teacher beat,
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consider whether the employee was engaged in a required or
incidental pursuit and whether the institution could reasonably
foresee the conduct. 124 If either factor applies, then the institu-
tion would be liable even if the employee had a malicious
intent.125 This looser standard would not put the institutions on
a slippery slope toward strict liability but rather would force
them to accept responsibility for the acts an employee commits
while acting as an employee.
Unfortunately, courts continue to undermine the potential of
vicarious liability by refusing to apply a modified scope of
employment analysis. The reasons for such strict judicial inter-
pretation possibly include a fear of either undermining public
institutions or creating strict liability. In most cases, the courts
determine scope of employment as a matter of law.1'2 In reality,
reasonable persons may disagree as to the scope of the employ-
ment, signaling that the issue is actually a question of fact.127
For example, in Moseley v. Second New St. Paul Baptist
Church,128 the court granted the institution's motion for sum-
mary judgment because the church hired the abuser as a janitor,
a position that the court found to have no relation to child
safety, and also because the plaintiff failed to substantiate
allegations that the janitor performed a security function. 29 Had
the victim introduced sufficient evidence that the janitor did
perform a security function, the court would have proceeded to
try the case. 30 Without any factual support, the court did not
have a question of material fact about whether the abuse oc-
curred within the scope of employment and hence could not
impose liability.'3'
Another example is that of a day care aide whose responsi-
bilities included assisting children in the bathroom and main-
taining hygiene of their private parts.3 2 Although evidence
choked, and slandered a student using racial and other epithets. Id. at 731. The majority
held that the school district was potentially liable for the beatings but not the epithets. Id.
at 732. At trial, the victim needed to prove that he believed the teacher's use of force was
within the scope of the teacher's employment. Id-
124. Cordts v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 252 Cal. Rptr. 629, 631 (Ct. App. 1988).
125. Id.
126. Webb v. Jewel Cos., 485 N.E.2d 409, 411 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
127. Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053, 1057 (Utah 1989).
128. 534 A.2d 346 (D.C. 1987).
129. Id. at 348.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 349.
132. 524 N.E.2d 966, 96869 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
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existed to show that the aide sexually assaulted and molested
a child under her care, 133 the court in Randi F. v. High Ridge
YMCA decided as a matter of law that such acts were solely
for the aide's personal gratification and beyond the scope of
employment. 134 Even though the acts occurred within the time
and place of her job, and despite the plaintiff's allegation that
the abuse occurred during the performance of assigned tasks
and duties of her employment, the court believed the abuse to
be too much of a deviation and unanticipated. 3 5
These results disregard the fact that "where personal moti-
vations so mingle with the employee's pursuit of occupational
duties that it is arguable whether the employee's action is
incidental to his duties,"' 36 the result should be determined by
members of the community and not by the court on a motion
to dismiss. 37
Business Interests
Another requirement for imposing liability for personal acts
is that the act be in furtherance of the employer's business
interests. 38 Child abuse clearly is not in the institution's inter-
ests. Because few personal acts by employees will ever be in
the business or ideological interests of an institution, the courts
should not read the requirement so strictly. 39 Furthermore, as
mentioned earlier, because the employee commits the abuse
only because of the very fact of employment within the insti-
tution's operations, it seems fair to impose liability on the
employer for creating the hazardous situation.4 '
133. Id. at 969.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 971. The court apparently ignored the fact that the aide's tasks gave her an
opportunity to commit the abuse.
136. Alma W. v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 176 Cal. Rptr. 287, 290 (Ct. App. 1981).
137. I& at 289.
138. Webb v. Jewel Cos., 485 N.E.2d 409, 411 (ll. App. Ct. 1985). In some cases, the extent
of the deviation may be a factor, but the court in Webb did not consider the issue. Id.
139. John R. v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 769 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1989) (holding that molestation
was not within scope of employment); Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053 (Utah
1989) (determining that therapist's acts were not within scope of employment); Webb, 485
N.E.2d at 409 (holding that store security guard acted outside scope of employement when
he molested a girl detained for shoplifting); Hoover v. University of Chicago Hosp., 366
N.E.2d 925 (IlI. App. Ct. 1977) (dismissing hospital from case because rape and assault by
attending doctor was not in furtherance of hospital's business and was solely for doctor's
benefit). Courts generally focus on the extent to which the employee's act affects the conduct
of future business. See, e.g., Birkner, 771 P.2d at 1058.
140. See Beezer, supra note 73, at 1119.
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When no evidence exists to prove that the institution author-
ized or ratified the employee's acts, liability is denied.141 Again,
explicit, authorization or ratification of child abuse is rare. The
same rationale applies to other agency relationships, either paid
or volunteer.142
Constitutional Theories of Liability and Remedies'43
The United States Constitution protects citizens from the
deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law.' 44 The right to be free from child abuse is not a per se
fundamental right but may be grounded in the right of privacy
via the liberty interest, 45 because the abuse deprives the child
of a right to personal or bodily security. 46 The Federal Civil
Rights Act of 1871 further protects citizens against the depri-
vation of any constitutional rights, privileges, or immunities. 47
Courts, however, are reluctant to impose liability for the dep-
rivation of such rights 14 and frequently employ the Federal
Tort Claims Act 149 (FTCA) assault and battery exceptions' 50 to
excuse institutions from liability.' 51
By permitting the abuse to occur, either by commission or
omission, institutions violate children's constitutional rights
141. See Milla v. Tamayo, 232 Cal. Rptr. 685 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding archdiocese not liable
because archbishop did not ratify the abuse); Community Theatres Co. v. Bentley, 76 S.E.2d
632 (Ga. Ct. App. 1953) (holding company not liable for sexual abuse unauthorized by company).
142. See generally Cordts v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 252 Cal. Rptr. 629 (Ct. App. 1988)
(holding that sexual abuse committed by scout leader was outside scope of agency).
143. Constitutional theories are considered here only briefly. For more extensive coverage,
see William D. Valente, School District and Official Liability for Teacher Sexual Abuse of
Students Under 42 US.C. S 1983, 57 Educ. L. Rep. (West) 645 (1990).
144. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
145. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (recognizing a liberty interest that
encompasses the freedom from bodily restraint, but holding that it was not violated by
statute allowing corporal punishment in school); Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 667
F. Supp. 1088, 1093-95 (W.D. Pa. 1987) (discussing a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest
as encompassing freedom from threats, abuse, intimidation, and harassment), affd, 856 F.2d
594 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 489 U.S. 1062 (1989).
146. Schaefer, supra note 6, at 1421; Valente, supra note 143, at 646.
147. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
148. See, e.g., Sherrell v. City of Longview, 683 F. Supp. 1108 (E.D. Tex. 1987) (holding
negligent deprivation of civil rights is not actionable).
149. 42 U.S.C. SS 2671-2680 (1988).
150. See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
151. But see Doe v. Durtschi, 716 P.2d 1238, 1245 (Idaho 1986) (assault and battery exception
to state tort claims statute did not bar recovery against school district that continued to
employ a teacher after it had knowledge that the teacher sexually abused students).
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and expose the institutions to S 1983 claims. 152 Recovery is
permitted if the victim proves that the public or private insti-
tution committed a constitutional violation that proximately
caused the child's injury.15 3 Furthermore, the child must prove
institutional culpability, by showing either that the employee
acted under "color of law,"' 54 or that he acted intentionally or
recklessly. 155
The judicial reaction to the use of constitutional theories of
liability in employee abuse cases has been mixed. In 1988, the
molestation of three students by a teacher who had previously
been convicted for sodomizing other children resulted in a
damage award based on the violation of the children's Four-
teenth Amendment liberty interests. 156 In other cases, judges
refused to hold the institutions accountable when the victim
could not prove any pattern of deliberate indifference by the
institution. 57
Statutory Theories of Liability and Remedies
Federal Tort Claims Act
Enacted in 1946, the Federal Tort Claims Act'5 codifies the
federal government's waiver of sovereign immunity and general
152. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 39, S 131, at 1048; see also D.T. v. Independent Sch.
Dist., 894 F.2d 1176, 1188 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 213 (1990); Valente, supra note
143, at 645.
153. See Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285 (1980); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't,
901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1988) (discussing special relationship analysis).
154. See, e.g., D.T., 894 F.2d at 1186-87 (distinguishing teacher's summer activities from
school duties regardless of fact that he would be perceived by the students to be acting on
school's behalf).
155. The only actionable claims are intentional torts, not negligence. Ruth V. Siegel,
Failure to Report Suspected Child Abuse: Potential Civil Rights Liability for School Districts,
34 Educ. L. Rep. (West) 345, 347 (1987).
156. Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 667 F. Supp. 1088 (W.D. Pa. 1987), affid, 856
F.2d 594 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 489 U.S. 1062 (1989).
157. Doe v. Special Sch. Dist., 901 F.2d 642, 646-47 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding no liability and
imposing costs on the plaintiff); see also Doe v. Durtschi, 716 P2d 1238, 1244-45 (Idaho 1986)
(holding that a school district could be liable for negligence if it continued to employ a
teacher after having knowledge that he was sexually abusing students); Howard, supra note
82, at 8.
158. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, ch. 753, tit. 4, 60 Stat.
812, 84247 (1946) (current version at 28 U.S.C. SS 2671-2680 (1988)). Some states have enacted
comparable legislation. See, e.g., Idaho Tort Claims Act, IDAHO CODE § 6-901 to
-929 (1990), discussed in Durtschi, 716 P.2d 1238 (Idaho 1986); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 258,
5 2 (1988), discussed in A.L. v. Commonwealth, 521 N.E.2d 1017 (Mass. 1988); MICH. COMP.
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consent to be sued in tort.1 9 The government may be held liable
"in the same manner and to the same extent as a private
individual under like circumstances."'' 6 The FTCA voids any
distinction between public and private institutions, except for a
specific reservation of immunity. Negligent supervision claims
are thus possible, as are vicarious liability claims, if the act is
within the scope of employment. 161
The FTCA specifically recognizes that liability may be imposed
for omissions as well as for affirmative acts. For this reason, the
United States may be held liable for negligent failure to act as well
as for affirmative conduct, provided that applicable state law would
impose a duty to act upon a private person similarly situated. 162
However, unlimited application of the FTCA does not occur. 63
Excluded from coverage are any claims related to assault, bat-
tery, false imprisonment, or defamation, 164 and an exception is
provided for government conduct that involves policy decisions
or discretionary functions. 65 In effect, the exceptions reinstate
LAWS ANN. S 691.1407 (1987), discussed in Galli v. Kirkeby, 248 N.W.2d 149 (Mich. 1976); N.M.
STAT. ANN. SS 41-4-1 to -27 (1978), discussed in Garcia v. Albuquerque Pub. Schs. Bd. of
Educ., 622 P.2d 699 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980).
In 1988, Congress amended the FTCA by enacting the Federal Employees' Liability
Reform and Tort Claims Act (FELRTCA) to temper the judicially heightened standards for
immunity claims. Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563 (1988) (codified at 28 U.S.C. 5 2679
(1988)). FELRTCA provides an exclusive remedy against the government for certain tortious
acts of federal employees committed within the scope of employment and immunizes the
employee from personal liability by substituting the United States for the employee and
precluding all other actions. 28 U.S.C. 5 2679(b) (1988). The decision of what is within the
scope of employment is made by certification of the Attorney General. Id. S 2679(d).
159. KEETON ET AL., supra note 39, § 131, at 1034. Consent to suits and specific waivers
regarding particular matters may be found in other sections of the FTCA. Id. at 1034 n.16.
160. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1988).
161. Andrews v. United States, 732 F.2d 366 (4th Cir. 1984). In Andrews, the court held
that the employee's sexual relationship with his patient was not within the scope of his
duties as a Navy doctor because the acts furthered only his own interests. Id. at 370.
However, because the supervising doctors were negligent in performing their duties within
the scope of their employment, the court imposed liability on the government. Id.
162. KEETON ET AL., supra note 39, S 131, at 1035. In determining the liability, the court
applies the tort law of the state where the harm occurred. Id. at 1034.
163. Id. at 1035-38.
164. 28 U.S.C. S 2680(h); KEETON ET AL., supra note 39, S 131, at 1038. In Andrews, the
court held that the assault and battery exception was not applicable because the patient
consented to sexual intercourse. 732 F.2d at 371. In child abuse cases, however, consent is
not possible. David Finkelhor, What's Wrong with Sex Between Adults and Children in CHiLD
ABUSE: COMMISSION AND OMISSION, supra note 1, at 401, 403.
165. 28 U.S.C. S 2680(a); KEETON ET AL., supra note 39, S 131, at 1039. Courts avoid
adjudicating the liability of discretionary functions based on separation of powers doctrine.
When a discretionary policy results in an injury at the operational level, however, liability
is not avoided. Id.
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government immunity for certain suits. The courts, however, find
liability in most cases of serious physical interference. 16  Because
no rational argument can be made that child abuse is not a
serious physical interference, government institutions should not
avoid liability under the FTCA. Although the institutions attempt
to employ the assault and battery or discretionary function ex-
ceptions, given the serious physical interference inherent in child
abuse cases, courts should not apply the exceptions.
Privileges and Immunities Previously Enjoyed by Institutions
Are Virtually Nonexistent
Institutional immunity defenses operate as counterarguments
to liability. The institutions claim that regardless of whether
liability may be imposed pursuant to tort or employment law
concepts, their public or charitable nature gives them a privileged
status that exempts them from the application of the law. The
privileges are sovereign immunity and charitable immunity, the
application of which tends to subordinate the rights of children
to the interests of the institutions.
Charitable Immunity
Previously, the doctrine of charitable immunity completely
protected charities from all tort liability. 167 Although the doctrine
has eroded in almost all jurisdictions, 168 some states have statu-
166. KEETON ET AL., supra note 39, S 131, at 1038. Liability is generally not imposed for
mere economic harm. Id.
167. Charitable immunity for religious institutions differs from the protections offered by
the First Amendment; as a result, the issue of institutional liability for employee abuse does
not implicate the First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion. See Lee W. Brooks,
Note, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Spiritual Counselors: Can Outrageous
Conduct Be "Free Exercise"?, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1296 (1986). The First Amendment does not
immunize religious institutions from tort liability but rather is only a defense to religious
conduct. Id. at 1303. No argument has yet been made that abusing children is a sincerely
held religious practice. See Erickson v. Christenson, 781 P.2d 383, 386 (Or. Ct. App. 1989)
(holding that a claim by a parishioner against a pastor for intentional infliction of emotional
harm for seducing her was not barred by the religion clauses of the First Amendment),
appeal dismissed, 817 P.2d 758 (Or. 1991).
168. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 37, 5 895E (declaring that charities are
no longer immune from liability merely because of charitable foundations). Some states,
however, still immunize charities from liability. Cf. KE TON ET AL., supra note 39, S 133, at
1070-71 (discussing the various modifications of immunity). But see Note, The Quality of
Mercy: "Charitable Torts" and Their Continuing Immunity, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1382 (1987)
(discussing a countertrend of new emerging forms of immunity).
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torily reinstated the immunity.169 Courts upheld, and to some
extent still uphold, 170 charitable immunity for fear that liability
would divert trust funds contrary to the charitable donor's intent
and would discourage future donations. 71 Also, the courts be-
lieved that accepting charity would constitute assumption of the
risk of charitable negligence. 72 Before being abrogated, the doc-
trine immunized religious organizations, 73 hospitals, 174 and edu-
cational institutions.7 5
In partially reinstating the immunity, however, some states
recognized the need to hold charities accountable for certain
actions and thus exempted administrative negligence from im-
munity.176 As a result, charitable immunity may not protect an
institution for any employee abuse that creates a negligent hiring
or retention cause of action; the institution is subject to suit as
if it were a private corporation. 177 This result is infinitely pref-
erable to the approach taken by the Supreme Court of New
Jersey, which upheld the statutory reinstatement of immunity in
an action against a church by parents of a child who committed
suicide after suffering employee abuse. 78 In Schultz v. Roman
Catholic Archdiocese,'79 the court, relying on strict statutory con-
169. See Schultz v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese, 472 A.2d 531, 532-33, 536 (N.J. 1984)
(discussing New Jersey's Charitable Immunity Act).
170. Anthony Jackson, Case Note, Exclusion of Diocesan Liability for Negligence of Parish
Priest, 58 U. CiN. L. REV. 323 (1989) (discussing a case that applied common law respondeat
superior principles in refusing to impute liability).
171. KEETON ET AL., supra note 39, S 133, at 1069-70. A further consideration may be that
charitable institutions are less likely to be able to pay; however, an inability to pay is
generally no excuse on any issue in any forum. See Leger v. Stockton Unified Sch. Dist., 249
Cal. Rptr. 688, 700 (Ct. App. 1988) (rejecting defendant's claim that inability to afford liability
negates a duty of care).
172. KEETON ET AL., supra note 39, S 133, at 1069-70.
173. David Frohlich, Note, Will Courts Make Change for a Large Denomination?: Problems
of Interpretation in an Agency Analysis in Which a Religious Denomination Is Involved in an
Ascending Liability Tort Case, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1377 (1987); see also Schultz, 472 A.2d at 536
(determining that New Jersey's Charitable Immunity Act barred sexual abuse claim against
archdiocese).
174. See 1 STEVEN E. PEGALIS & HARVEY F. WACHSMAN, AMERICAN LAW OF MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE SS 3:31, 3:32 (1980 & Supp. 1991); I. Trotter Hardy, Jr., When Doctrines Collide:
Corporate Negligence and Respondeat Superior When Hospital Employees Fail to Speak Up,
61 TUL. L. REV. 85, 86 n.3 (1986).
175. See, e.g., Vermillion v. Woman's College, 88 S.E. 649 (S.C. 1916).
176. See, e.g., Schultz, 472 A.2d at 532-33, 536 (discussing New Jersey's Charitable Immunity
Act).
177. Hipp v. Hospital Auth., 121 S.E.2d 273 (Ga. Ct. App. 1961) (imposing liability on
charity for negligent hiring and retention). Corporate negligence actions provide another
means of circumventing charitable immunity. Hardy, supra note 174, at 89-90 n.14.
178. Schultz, 472 A.2d 531.
179. Id.
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struction, refused to adopt an administrative negligence or neg-
ligent hiring exception to the statutory grant of full immunity. 180
The court recognized the nationwide attack on charitable immu-
nity but nevertheless rejected public policy because the legisla-
ture had focused on protecting the economic interests of
charities. 8"
As the dissent in Schultz pointed out, the majority ignored a
basic premise of the law of charitable immunity: immunity is
conditional.182 The availability of immunity hinges on whether the
institution is pursuing its charitable endeavors at the time of the
injurious conduct.ee Because child abuse clearly does not meet
any charitable ends, immunity is not warranted. Finding a lack
of immunity subjects the institution to liability for its negligence
and forces it to select competent employees'8 and accept respon-
sibility for the injurious actions of its employees. 85
Sovereign Immunity
Sovereign immunity, or government immunity, bars suits
against local, state, and federal governments, and some
individual government officials, except when statutory
consent to or waiver of liability has been granted. 186 Absent
180. Id. N.J. STAT. ANN. S 2A:53A-7 reads: "No nonprofit corporation, society or association
organized exclusively for religious, charitable, educational or hospital purposes shall . . . be
liable to respond in damages to any person who shall suffer damage from the negligence of
any agent or servant of such corporation, society or association, where such person is a
beneficiary. ... The statute further mandates that any person "unconcerned in and
unrelated to and outside of the benefactions of such corporation" shall have the right to
recover. Id The beneficiary distinction sets up an artificial barrier to recovery and produces
anomalous results, as shown in Schultz.
181. Schultz, 472 A.2d at 535.
182. Id. at 539 (discussing public policy exceptions).
183. Id. at 542 ("The immunity protects the charity in its normal endeavors, and not in
activities that are antithetical to its charitable ends.").
184. See, e.g., J. v. Victory Tabernacle Baptist Church, 372 S.E.2d 391 (Va. 1988) (holding
a religious organization liable for torts caused by negligent employee selection); Hipp v.
Hospital Auth., 121 S.E.2d 273 (Ga. Ct. App. 1961) (applying similar standards to a charitable
institution).
185. Infant C. v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 391 S.E.2d 322 (Va. 1990); Victory Tabernacle.
372 S.E.2d at 391.
186. KEETON Er AL., supra note 39, S 131, at 1033; see Galli v. Kirkeby, 248 N.W.2d 149
(Mich. 1976) (holding that the hiring of public school personnel is covered by sovereign
immunity); Bozarth v. Harper Creek Bd. of Educ., 288 N.W2d 424 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979)
(stating that governmental immunity precludes tort actions against school boards for injuries
arising out of negligent employee selection). The rationale for sovereign immunity is the
necessity of protecting the government's ability to perform its functions. Garcia v. Albuquer-
que Pub. Schs. Bd. of Educ., 622 P.2d 699, 700 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980); KIELY, supra note 27,
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consent,187 the government is completely immune from tort liabil-
ity.1ss Regardless of a citizen's entrustment of personal security to
the government's and the government's role as a fiduciary,'1° the
law allows the government to escape its obligations via sovereign
immunity.
The policy reasons for excusing liability include protecting
public funds, allowing the government to function unhampered,
and encouraging the government to provide unprofitable serv-
ices. 91 Again, considering the nature of the institutions involved,
sovereign immunity provides a strong and generally successful
defense for governmental institutions embroiled in employee abuse
suits. 92 The threshold question is whether a public duty exists;
if it does, then the court decides whether sovereign immunity
applies to the facts. 193 Schools, hospitals, and social agencies
operating as governmental entities usually enjoy the protection
of sovereign immunity. 94
Sovereign immunity, however, provides only a limited defense.
Some state legislatures have abrogated the doctrine of sovereign
immunity by statutorily dictating that certain defendants have
consented to suit.195 Additionally, some states have waived soy-
at 159. The immunity has been abrogated in recent years at the federal level. See supra
notes 158-66 and accompanying text (discussing FTCA). Most states have consented to some
liability. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 39, 5 131, at 1044-45, for the states' various approaches
and degrees of abrogation. However, at all levels immunity remains strong for policy and
discretionary acts and decisions. Id. The hiring of employees is obviously a necessary
governmental function. See Gaston v. Becker, 314 N.W.2d 728 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
187. Such consent to suit may be found in the FTCA or FELRTCA. See supra notes 158-
59 and accompanying text.
188. KEETON ET AL., supra note 39, S 131, at 1033, 1043.
189. SHAPo, supra note 39, at 151.
190. Id. at 152-53.
191. See, e.g., Garcia v. Albuquerque Pub. Schs. Bd. of Educ., 622 P.2d 699 (N.M. Ct. App.
1980) (justifying partial immunity to protect the public treasury, avoid hampering government
functions, and allow services at a reasonable cost).
192. See Landstrom v. Illinois Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 892 F.2d 670 (7th Cir.
1990); Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1989), ert. denied, 493
U.S. 1044 (1990).
193. See supra note 39 and accompanying text defining public duty. See generally RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 37, § 895A-895C (discussing the extent of federal, state,
and local sovereign immunity); Christina B. Whitman, Government Responsibility for Consti-
tutional Torts, 85 MICH. L. REV. 225 (1986) (discussing when the government should be liable
for injuries resulting from the violation of constitutional rights).
194. See Fanning v. Montgomery County Children & Youth Servs., 702 F. Supp. 1184 (ED.
Pa. 1988) (holding that a social worker had absolute immunity); Sherrell v. City of Longview,
683 F. Supp. 1108 (ED). Tex. 1987) (barring the claim regardless of the public employee's
violent propensities); PEGALIS & WACHSMAN, upra. note 174, at %S 3:31, 3:32; Note, Sovereign
Immunity for State Hospital Employees After James v. Jane, 67 VA. L. REv. 393 (1981).
195. Note, supra note 194, at 393. In so doing, the legislature places the public employer
on par with a private employer; accordingly, public institutions warrant equal liability.
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ereign immunity to the extent of insurance coverage. 196 Further-
more, sovereign immunity protects only those who acted with
due care; any negligent act or omission waives the immunity, 1'
including the negligent act of hiring and retaining employees
who commit torts. 98
Courts recognize the need to compensate the injured individual
and balance that need against the government's need to maintain
its operations. 199 The need to protect the public treasury is
undermined in the long run, however, as society will continue to
expend more public funds for the care and support of abused
children and the dysfunctional adults they become.20
Strict Liability
Strict liability, the imposition of liability without regard to
fault,201 is an extreme but effective method of forcing employers
to make reparations to children abused in their institutions.
Although not yet recognized by any court, strict liability for
employee abuse would ensure that victims receive compensation
and encourage employers to operate more carefully. The weak-
nesses of the strict liability argument include burdening employ-
ers who act in good faith and without any culpability. 20 2
Additionally, strict liability ignores the "preferences, foolishness,
or wickedness of third parties,"203 and thus makes the institution
the insurer of child safety.204
Strict liability is most commonly applied against manufacturers
of defective products;2 5 the policy approaches used in determining
196. Beezer, supra note 73, at 1123 n.35.
197. Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053, 1059 (Utah 1989).
198. Hipp v. Hospital Auth., 121 S.E.2d 273, 274 (Ga. Ct. App. 1961).
199. A.L. v. Commonwealth, 521 N.E.2d 1017, 1028 (Mass. 1988) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
200. Alma W. v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 176 Cal. Rptr. 287, 292 (Ct. App. 1981)
(discussing economic costs of abused children); Commentary, UPI, July 11, 1990, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (stating that the cost of ignoring child abuse is unbearable).
201. KEETON ET AL., supra note 39, S 75, at 534.
202. See generally id. at 534-38 (explaining the history and the policy reasons for imposing
strict liability).
203. HuBER, supra note 37, at 40.
204. Cf. Congleton v. Starlite Skate Ctr., Inc., 333 S.E.2d 677, 680 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985)
(refusing to hold proprietor liable when child's injuries resulted from misuse of safe premises
by a third party).
205. A product may be manufactured or designed defectively or may lack adequate
warnings about proper usage. April A. Caso, Note, Unreasonably Dangerous Products from
a Child's Perspective: A Proposal for a Reasonable Child Consumer Expectation Test, 20
RuTERas L.J. 433, 436 (1989).
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whether strict liability should apply, however, can guide courts
in evaluating employer liability in employee abuse cases. The
consumer expectation test determines the "reasonable expecta-
tions of the ordinary consumer";2 6 the risk-utility approach bal-
ances the utility of the product to the consumer and the public,
the likelihood and extent of injury, the availability of safer
alternative products, the feasibility of alternatives, and the con-
sumer's ability to avoid injury.207
Applying the consumer expectation test to employee abuse
results in a finding that institutions should be liable for employee
abuse: both parents and children expect the institution to guard
against abuse and this expectation is reasonable. 20 8 As for the
risk-utility factors, although the benefits of scouting, education,
and religious activity are many, a child who suffers abuse while
participating in the activity most likely believes the risks out-
weigh the benefits. The magnitude of the harm to a child who
suffers employee abuse is great,2 9 and the child is often unable
to avoid the abuse.210 Furthermore, by properly conducting its
operations, an institution may feasibly offer children a safer
environment.21 1 On balance, the utility of the benefits provided
to both the child and society is outweighed by the risk of harm
and availability of alternatives. Accordingly, under either strict
liability test,212 institutions must assume responsibility for the
206. Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 230 N.W.2d 794, 798
(Wis. 1975); see Caso, supra note 205, at 437-38 (describing the consumer expectation test).
207. Caso, supra note 205, at 437 n.19.
208. Cf id at 441-50 (discussing the extent to which reasonable consumer expectations of
the parent and child differ). This distinction is inappropriate in the employee abuse context,
because the interests of both parent and child are the same. However, April Caso does
argue that in products liability cases, the expectation of the child-user should control. Id. at
454, 459.
209. See supra note 12.
210. In A.L. v. Commonwealth, 521 N.E.2d 1017 (Mass. 1988), the teacher threatened to
abuse the child's younger brother if he reported the teacher's actions. Id. at 1019. In Milla
v. Tamayo, 232 Cal. Rptr. 685 (Ct. App. 1986), not only did the priests tell the child that
intercourse was "ethically and religiously permissible," but they also sent her to the
Philippines to keep her quiet. Id. at 687-88. Furthermore, children lack free will and are
incapable of consenting to the contacts. Finkelhor, supra note 164, at 403-04.
211. If an institution is not able to properly conduct its business, however, the child may
be left without any alternatives because the choice of institution may be limited. See, e.g.,
Fazzolari v. Portland Sch. Dist. No. 1J, 734 P.2d 1326 (Or. 1987) (noting that Oregon
compulsory attendance law leaves most families few choices about where to send their
children to school); supra note 49 (noting lack of alternatives).
212. A hybrid of the two tests achieves the same result, because it first measures
reasonable consumer expectations and if none exist, it then balances the risk-utility factors.
Caso, supra note 205, at 439.
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abuse inflicted on a child, regardless of any actual institutional
fault.
Criticism of the strict liability argument is directed at the
cases in which institutions may be found liable for an employee's
abusive actions that were unpreventable. The counterargument
is equally persuasive: the premise of strict liability is that no
fault is necessary and so it is for society to choose who should
be the liable party. Neither society nor the courts could be faulted
for favoring the interests of children over an artificial institution.
PUBLIC POLICY REASONS FOR IMPOSING LIABILITY
As shown above, legal theories are already in place for impos-
ing liability for employee child abuse on institutional employers. 213
Institutional employer liability for employee child abuse is not
unfounded nor unreasonable. 214 In determining such claims, the
courts should continually balance fairness to children against the
need for effective community services.21 The public policy rea-
sons that support the argument for institutional liability for
employee abuse include the availability of insurance,2 6 licensure
and certification requirements, 217 and potential malpractice liabil-
ity.218 Finally, many of the reasons for the criminal justice sys-
tem's approach to punishment support the argument in favor of
institutional liability.
Institutions May Insure Against Child Abuse
Traditionally, courts refused to hold institutions liable for em-
ployee child abuse for public policy reasons based on the nature
213. See supra text accompanying notes 36-212.
214. An institution is already subject to liability for ordinary acts of negligence committed
by its employees and, as in most tort cases, liability is not excused upon proving lack of
knowledge or foreseeability. KEETON ET AL., supra note 39, SS 69-70, at 499-503. In employee
abuse cases, many victims can prove the institution had the requisite knowledge and
anticipated the plaintiffs expectation of protection. E.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308
(1975) (holding that schools are not immune when they know or should know that their
actions would violate a student's constitutional rights); A.L., 521 N.E.2d at 1022-23 (taking
into account whether threatened persons had the opportunity to protect themselves); Leger
v. Stockton Unified Sch. Dist., 249 Cal. Rptr. 688 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding that attacks on
students were reasonably, foreseeable, and that this satisfied plaintiffs burden); see also
Beezer, supra note 73, at 1117.
215. A.L., 521 N.E.2d at 1026 (Hennessey, C.J., concurring).
216. See infra notes 219-41 and accompanying text.
217. See infra notes 242-61 and accompanying text.
218. See infra notes 262-78 and accompanying text.
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and services provided by the institutions. Many of these concerns
are unfounded in light of the possibility of insurance coverage.
An institution may insure against acts of employee child abuse,
and individual professionals also may obtain insurance.2 19 The
institutions that this Note has considered- schools, churches,
hospitals, and other organizations- are in the business of ren-
dering services and care to children. Most institutions may an-
ticipate that some amount of child abuse may result in the course
of business.20 If so, then such institutions should be permitted
to insure against the abuse, and the insurer should cover the
institution when the foreseen abuse occurs.a 1
Insurers are not required to cover intentional torts because
indemnification may result in encouragement of future tortious
acts.22 If the abuse is insured, then the actual perpetrator does
not "pay" for the crime and may freely commit further acts
knowing of likely indemnification.23 In the case of institutional
liability, however, the institution itself is not committing the
intentional abuse. Insurance coverage for criminal acts violates
public policy, 24 but courts misinterpret the policy of prohibiting
indemnification for one's own violation of criminal statutes and
fail to recognize that the institution is not the actual criminal.225
For example, homeowner insurance policies do not cover child
abuse in the home by the person maintaining the policy, because
to do so would absolve the perpetrator of liability and in a sense,
219. Worcester Ins. Co. v. Fells Acres Day Sch., Inc., 558 N.E.2d 958, 966 (Mass. 1990)
(sexual abuse covered under "Special Multi-Peril" policy). Furthermore, liability insurance is
available to churches for pastoral miscounseling. C. Eric Funston, Note, Made Out of Whole
Cloth? A ConstiNtional Analysis of the Clergy Malpractice Concept, 19 CAL. W. L. REv. 507,
508 & n.11 (1983). Additionally, insurance coverage may preclude the sovereign immunity
defense in some states. Beezer, supra note 73, at 1123 n.35; 2 Med. & Hosp. Negl. (Callahan)
5 20 (1988-90).
220. As Bruce Beezer stated: "The injury to students by acts of commission or omission
by school personnel is not unusual." Beezer, supra note 73, at 1117.
221. In discussing the effects of the tort liability epidemic, Peter Huber points out that
for "day care centers . . . insurance became wholly unavailable at any price." HUBER, supra
note 37, at 13. The lack of insurance not only results in underinsured operations but also
forces some enterprises out of business entirely. Id Although promoting the "survival of
the economically fittest" has some merit, such a system has a discriminatory effect. Specif-
ically, the underprivileged population suffers the most from the effects of underinsured
institutions or no institutions at all. Id. at 13-14; Congress Told Insurance Costs Critical, UPI,
Dec. 3, 1985, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. See supra notes 20-21 and
accompanying text for a discussion of societal abuse.
222. Worcester Ins. Co., 558 N.E.2d at 970.
223. KIELY, supra note 27, at 21.
224. Id. at 22 n.78.
225. I&
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reward the abuser for the abuse.226 In the institutional situation,
however, the employer is insuring against the acts of another
and therefore is neither punished nor rewarded.
Insurers need not indemnify institutions if the policy contains
an "intentional injury" exclusion provision,227 because insurance
does not protect one from the consequential harm of expected or
intended acts.228 In cases of child abuse, harm to the child is
viewed as inherent in the act itself229 and "substantially certain
to result,"' 23 and therefore, the intent to injure is presumed.?-"
Yet, much of the abuse committed is with the institution's knowl-
edge.232 In such cases, knowledge should not void insurance cov-
erage on claims of negligence, because the knowledge and
subsequent failure to act or protect may be construed as reck-
lessness. The abuse is thus neither expected nor intentional, but
accidental, and therefore covered. 23 Furthermore, if abuse at an
institution is so prevalent that it may be considered a routine
practice, 234 then courts must impute liability regardless of whether
the abuse serves to further the institution's business. 2ss
The concept of "deep pockets" complements the insurance
rationale. The deep pocket theory recognizes that the institution
is financially more capable than the individual employee of com-
pensating the abused child.23s That does not mean imposing lia-
bility on the employer merely because the institution has the
226. Id.
227. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. McCranie, 716 F. Supp. 1440 (S.D. Fla. 1989), affd sub nom.
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Manning, 904 F.2d 713 (11th Cir. 1990); Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Leeber,
376 S.E.2d 581 (W. Va. 1988).
228. John D. Boyle & Michael R. O'Malley, Insurance Coverage for Punitive Damages and
Intentional Conduct in Massachusetts, 25 NEw ENG. L. REv. 827 (1991).
229. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 684 F. Supp. 1056, 1059-60 (W.D. Okla. 1988).
230. KIELY, supra note 27, at 19.
231. "A majority of the courts have held that in liability insurance cases involving sexual
abuse of children, the intent to cause injury can be inferred as a matter of law" Foremost
Ins. Co. v. Weetman, 726 F. Supp. 618, 620 (W.). Pa. 1989), affd, 904 F.2d 694 (3d Cir.), afj'd
sub -nom. In re Platek, 904 F.2d 696 (3d Cir.), and affid sub nom In re Weetman, 904 F.2d
697 (3d Cir. 1990); see Whitt v. Deleu, 707 F. Supp. 1011, 1014-15 (W-D. Wis. 1989); Thomas,
684 F. Supp. at 1058, 1060; Worcester Ins. Co. v. Fells Acres Day Sch., Inc., 558 N.E.2d 958,
965-66 (Mass. 1990); KIELY, supranote 27, at 18.
232. See, e.g., Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1989) (principal
knew for a period of years that teacher was abusing students), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1044
(1990); A.L. v. Commonwealth, 521 N.E.2d 1017 (Mass. 1988) (principal ignored report from
abused child's mother who witnessed abuser's suspicious behavior).
233. Worcester Ins. Co., 558 N.E.2d at 970.
234. Again, consider the facts of Stoneking, in which over the course of years several
students reported the teacher's abuse to institutional supervisors. Stoneking, 882 F.2d at 720.
235. Worcester Ins. Co., 558 N.E.2d at 969.
236. HUBER, supra note 37, at 12.
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ability to pay: "What has been done .. . is not to institute a
system of liability without fault, but to broaden the fault liability
to include those who may properly be held responsible. 237 Fur-
thermore, the fact that an institution is a larger entity does not
support the assumption that the institution is always capable of
paying.m Institutions of this nature generally do not enjoy wide
profit margins, and their ability to pay large judgments is ques-
tionable.s 9 Because courts agree that an inability to pay is not a
valid excuse, 24° insurance provides a fair and effective means of
ensuring due compensation. 24'
Institutions and Employees Are Subject to Licensure Standards
and Malpractice Actions
Many service occupations require licensure or certification, and
public policy dictates that such certifications should be contingent
on a continued absence of abusive behavior. 242 Licensure is the
authorization granted by a government agency to individuals in
certain professions and occupations.243 Licensure certifies that
237. PROSSER, supra note 99, at 553 (emphasis added).
238. For example, 60% of day care centers are nonprofit organizations. Bane et a]., supra
note 42, at 27. Schools, religious centers, and day cares are sponsored by both profit and
nonprofit organizations.
239. See Galli v. Kirkeby, 248 N.W.2d 149, 156 (Mich. 1976) (Coleman, J., dissenting) (stating
that if the legislature allows liability, then it must give notice to the institutions so that
they have an opportunity to seek insurance or budget funds to cover any potential liability).
240. Leger v. Stockton Unified Sch. Dist., 249 Cal. Rptr. 688, 700 (Ct. App. 1988) (stating
that balancing needs is more important). In fact, evidence of insurance is generally inadmis-
sible in tort litigation because of the great likelihood that jurors will attach undue value to
the evidence and hence prejudice the defendant. See, e.g., FED. R. EVD. 411. The rule states:
Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not admissible
upon the issue whether the person acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully.
This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of insurance against liability
when offered for another purpose, such as proof of agency, ownership, or
control, or bias or prejudice of a witness.
241. No doubt many will attack this suggestion by claiming that such an approach earlier
resulted in a tort liability crisis. See generally HuBER, supra note 37, at 12-14 (arguing that
the recently expanded tort liability system, in both its safety and insurance effects, is highly
regressive; those with the least are hurt the most); Congress Told Insurance Costs Critical,
supra note 221 (discussing the problem of rising insurance costs resulting from skyrocketing
damage awards).
242. The purpose of licensure is "to protect the public health, morals, safety, and general
welfare." 1 DANmL B. HOGAN, THE REGULATION OF PSYCHOTHERAPISTS 238 (1979). "Investigating
nonfamilial abuse and neglect should be the responsibliilty of law enforcement, licensing, or
other agencies with the expertise and authority to investigate such cases, not of the Child
Protective Service Agency. Furthermore, such units must be independent of the agency or
facility being investigated, so that there is no conflict of interest:' BEsHAROV, supra note 41,
at 15 (emphasis added).
243. FRANK P. GRAD & NOELIA MARTI, PHYSICIANS' LICENSURE AND DISCIPLINE 54 (1979).
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"'those licensed have obtained a minimal degree of competency
[and] insure[s] that the public health, safety and welfare will be
reasonably well protected.' ",244 A license places its holder in a
position of trust and requires the professional to act responsi-
bly;2 45 a violation of licensing standards is a breach of trust,24 as
well as a violation of law.247
Many professions already impose certification require-
ments on their members, and many institutions require em-
ployees to be certified. 248  Institutions should investigate an
employment applicant's qualifications and must be assured that
the applicant is properly licensed. Failure to do so constitutes
corporate negligence.249 Teachers,250  doctors, 25 1 day care per-
sonnel,252 social workers, 253 volunteers,2 54 and even clergy 25 5 all
must meet licensing requirements. A breach of any licensing
244. Id. at 54 (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC.. & WELFARE, REPORT ON LICENSURE
AND RELATED PERSONNEL CREDENTIALING 7 (1971)). Additionally, child care-related organiza-
tions are subject to licensing independently of the professionals who work in them. Chalk-
board, Inc. v. Brandt, 902 F.2d 1375, 1376 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 509 (1990).
245. Padilla v. Minnesota State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 382 N.W.2d 876, 887 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1986). Professionals can be required continually to meet licensing standards. In re the
Revocation of the License of Polk, 449 A.2d 7, 20 (NJ. 1982).
246. Horak v. Biris, 474 N.E.2d 13, 17 (IMI. App. Ct. 1985).
247. Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053, 1058 (Utah 1989) (engaging in sexual
activities with clients is in direct violation of Utah statute that expressly forbids such conduct
in all circumstances).
248. See infra notes 250-55.
249. Hardy, supra note 174, at 91.
250. D.T. v. Independent Sch. Dist., 894 F.2d 1176, 1179 (10th Cir.) (discussing teacher
certification requirements), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 213 (1990); see also 2 WILLIAM D. VALENTE,
EDUCATION LAW 503 (1985) (outlining teacher certification requirements).
251. See GRAD & MARTI, supra note 243, at 54-56. See generally 2 HOGAN, supra note 242
(discussing psychotherapist and counselor licensing requirements, policy, and analysis). Hos-
pitals are subject to separate licensing standards. See Wogelius v. Dallas, 504 N.E.2d 791
(Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (discussing the Illinois Hospital Licensing Act requirements).
252. Bane et al., supra note 42, at 42; see Chalkboard, Inc. v. Brandt, 902 F.2d 1375 (9th
Cir.) (discussing standards for day care license), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 509 (1990); State Day-
Care Rules, USA TODAY, May 1, 1989, at A8 (reporting each state's minimum standards for
licensing day care centers).
253. Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053, 1058 (Utah 1989); Horak v. Biris, 474
N.E.2d 13 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985). Furthermore, some states require social workers to "register"
with the state in addition to obtaining a license. Id. at 19.
254. Infant C. v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 391 S.E.2d 322 (Va. 1990). The scout leader
selection process, as described in Infant C., is as follows: A local council finds a community
organization to sponsor a troop, and then a committee of the organization, composed of
parents and members, selects a scout leader. After the leader is chosen, the organization
notifies the local council of the selection, which in turn notifies the Boy Scouts of America
(BSA) headquarters. BSA checks a confidential file listing unfit people and notifies the local
council of those who meet BSA requirements with approval. BSA conducts no actual
investigation. Id. at 324-25.
255. See Washington v. Motherwell, 788 P.2d 1066, 1069 (Wash. 1990) (en banc (recognizing
that clergy status is conferred by license).
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standard may subject the holder to disciplinary action, includ-
ing license revocation,25 6 regardless of any criminal proceed-
ings.2 57
In addition to licensure and certification, many professions
are subject to professional codes of ethics. For example, the
medical profession requires its members to be of "good moral
character" and may expel any member failing to meet its
standards or who otherwise engages in unprofessional con-
duct.258 Social workers likewise are subject to a code of ethics. 25 9
Furthermore, state statutes may also set standards of profes-
sional conduct. 2 0 Statutes define the parameters of unprofes-
sional conduct; however, because most professional fields are
self-regulated, the interpretation of the statute is left to the
professions' review boards. 261
Malpractice claims, which are a modification of traditional
negligence principles, may be asserted for a failure to provide
good medical care;262 failure to provide good psychiatric care;263
256. In re the Revocation of the License of Polk, 449 A.2d 7 (N.J. 1982); Padilla v.
Minnesota State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 382 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Horak,
474 N.E.2d at 19. Interestingly, disciplinary actions are not viewed as punishment but rather
as protective measures for the public good. Padilla, 382 N.W.2d at 887.
257. Story v. Wyoming State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 721 P.2d 1013 (Wyo. 1986); Story
v. Wyoming, 721 P.2d 1020 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 962 (1986). Criminal proceedings are
independent of any disciplinary board actions. In re Plantier, 494 A.2d 270 (N.H. 1985).
258. In re Plantier, 494 A.2d at 272 (empowering medical board to discipline members for
dishonest, unprofessional, or immoral conduct); Bernstein v. Board of Medical Examiners, 22
Cal. Rptr. 419 (Ct. App. 1962) (revoking psychiatrist's license for crime of moral turpitude,
specifically, sexual intercourse with a minor).
Doctors are bound by the Hippocratic oath, which states: "'In every house where I come,
I will enter only for the good of my patients, keeping myself far from all intentional ill-doing
and all seduction, and especially from the pleasures of love with women and men.'" Andrews
v. United States, 732 F.2d 366, 368 n.2 (4th Cir. 1984) (quoting STEADMAN'S MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 579 (22d ed. 1972)).
259. Horak, 474 N.E.2d at 19.
260. See ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 111, para. 6315(b) (1979), discussed in Horak, 474 N.E2d at 19;
MINN. STAT. § 147.091 (1989), prior version discussed in Padilla, 382 N.W,2d at 884-86; N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. S 329:17 (1991), prior version discussed in In re Plantier, 494 A.2d at 271;
N.J. STAT. ANN. 45:1-21, 9-16 (1991), current version of 45:1-21 and prior version of 9-16
discussed in Polk, 449 A2d at 21; Wyo. STAT. § 33-26-129(b) (1977), discussed in Story, 721
P.2d at 1014-17.
261. See, e.g., Padilla, 382 N.W.2d at 886-87 (noting that the medical profession defines
and enforces its own standards). Board decisions are made using a preponderance of the
evidence standard; clear and convincing evidence supporting the decision is not required.
Polk, 449 A.2d at 12.
262. Good medical care is determined by reference to the standards of other reputable
doctors practicing in the same or similar locality and under similar circumstances. Richard
H. v. Larry D., 243 Cal. Rptr. 807, 809 (Ct. App. 1988).
263. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 353 (Cal. 1976) (holding therapist
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negligence in marital or spiritual counseling; 2 4 failure to
adequately instruct;265 or failure to provide competent coun-
seling.266 Additional support for a malpractice case may be
liable for failing to warn of patient's deadly threats); Linda Jorgenson et al., The Furor over
Psychotherapist-Patient Sexual Contact: New Solutions to an Old Problem, 32 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 645, 665 (1991) (citing Masters and Johnson study calling for the criminalization of
psychotherapist-patient sex in lieu of civil malpractice actions); Patrick S. Cassidy, Comment,
The Liability of Psychiatrists for Malpractice, 36 U. Prrr. L. REV. 108 (1974) (discussing
psychiatric malpractice in general); see supra note 18 for a discussion of the prevalence of
psychotherapist abuse of minor patients.
264. See generally Robert J. Basil, Note, Clergy Malpractice: Taking Spiritual Counseling
Conflicts Beyond Intentional Tort Analysis, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 419 (1988) (analyzing the consti-
tutional problems inherent in clergy malpractice actions and examining the role of the
judiciary in such disputes); Kelly B. Rouse, Note, Clergy Malpractice Claims: A New Problem
for Religious Organizations, 16 N. KY. L. REV. 383 (1988) (analyzing the emerging tort of
clergy malpractice); see also Nally v. Grace Community Church, 204 Cal. Rptr. 303 (Ct. App.
1984) (holding church liable for suicide after inadequate pastoral counseling). Courts distinguish
the clergy malpractice action from a negligent breach of duty because of First Amendment
concerns. In order to review a cause of action for clergy malpractice, the court must
determine the community standard of care; such a determination, however, would require
an examination of religious values, thus breaching the separation of church and state. Rouse,
supra, at 394-95.
In Milla v. Tamayo, 232 Cal. Rptr. 685 (Ct. App. 1986), a case involving the seduction of
a 16-year-old girl by several priests, the court considered professional malpractice conspiracy.
The California Court of Appeal, after finding that such claims were not barred by any
statute of limitations and were a valid cause of action, dismissed the action against the
priests' employer, the Archbishop of the Archdiocese of Los Angeles, on the grounds that
the acts were unforeseeable. Id. at 690.
265. See generally Karen H. Calavenna, Comment, Educational Malpractice, 64 U. DE'. L.
REv. 717 (1987) (discussing the possible theories of recovery for educational malpractice).
Most courts, however, do not recognize such a claim. See KIELY, supra note 27, at 309. One
reason for failing to recognize educational malpractice is that teaching is very much a
discretionary matter, and courts are reluctant to interfere with educational policies and the
daily administration of schools. See, e.g., Donahue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist., 391
N.E.2d 1352, 1354 (N.Y. 1979); KETON ET AL., supra note 39, S 131, at 1048-49. In the case
of child abuse, however, a teacher's academic freedom is not at issue; rather, the issue is
the educator's breach of a legal duty of care to the child. Child abuse clearly does not meet
the profession's reasonable care standard, and hence educational malpractice claims for child
abuse should be valid. See generally Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Tort Liability of Public Schools
and Institutions of Higher Learning for Educational Malpractice, 1 A.L.RATH 1139 (1990);
Perry A. Zirkel & Allan G. Osborne, Are Damages Available in Special Education Suits?, 42
Educ. L. Rep. (West) 497 (1988).
266. Social worker malpractice claims allege that an agency failed to provide competent
counseling or guidance, failed to meet a code of ethics, or otherwise breached duties of
loyalty, trust, and confidence. Horak v. Biris, 474 N.E.2d 13, 17 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985). Controversy
exists over recognizing a claim for social worker malpractice. Compare Horak, 474 N.E.2d
13 with Martino v. Family Serv. Agency, 445 N.E.2d 6, 8-9 (Il. App. Ct. 1982) (denying social
worker malpractice claims because the harm was unintentional, no policy reasons justified
permitting such claims, and not all of society's harms were viewed as reparable through
litigation). See also Wogelius v. Dallas, 504 N.E.2d 791, 796 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (citing Horak);
Janet B. Jones, Annotation, Social Worker Malpractice, 58 A.L.R.4TH 977 (1987).
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found in various state statutes. 267
Judges, however, have expressed concern over the diffi-
culty of conclusively determining the presence and source of
an injury.2 68 The appropriate standard of liability is one that
balances children's rights against the responsibilities of the
institution and the competence of courts to make judgments
in technical fields.2 6 9
Recognizing malpractice, whether in medicine, religion, ed-
ucation, or social work, as a grounds for recovery in employee
abuse cases is justified to prevent shielding "professionals
from any consequences of their actions to the detriment of
those individuals who turn to them in reliance upon their
professional expertise." 270 Malpractice liability also comple-
ments and serves as a means of enforcing various professional
and institutional licensing and certification requirements.
Certification and accreditation associations set minimally ac-
ceptable practice standards. Any misrepresentation of members'
capabilities exposes the associations to liability271 In some in-
stances, the funding the institution needs is contingent upon its
maintaining certification and conforming to regulations.2 2 Ac-
cordingly, associations should withhold certification and funding
when institutions fail to protect children from abusive employees.
An institution whose continued existence is determined by the
quality of its employees and care would be pressured to maintain
an abuse free environment. Given that much of the foundation is
267. In California, for example, a sexual relationship between a doctor and patient is a
cause for discipline. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 726 (West 1990). See generally Denise LeBoeuf,
Psychiatric Malpractice: Exploitation of Women Patients, 11 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 83 (1988)
(discussing cause of action against hospital and doctor for sexual relationship with patient).
268. Claims for sports injuries, conversely, are upheld because the source and injury are
identifiable. See generally John P. Lenich, One Strike and You're Out. An Overview of Negligence
and High School Athletics, 40 Educ. L. Rep. (West) 1 (1987) (discussing different instances of
negligence in the school sports context and the practical lessons such cases offer to school
administrators and coaches). As mentioned at the outset, child abuse is often subtle and
concealed. See supra note 24.
269. See Johnston v. Ann Arbor Pub. Schs., 569 F. Supp. 1502, 1508 (E.D. Mich. 1983)
(dismissing handicapped child's mistaken evaluation claim as not stating a cause of action
under the Rehabilitation Act and showing deference to state officials' professional judgment).
270. Horak, 474 N.E.2d at 19.
271. David E. Willett, Judicial Review: Liability in Tort for Certification or Accreditation
Activities, in LEGAL ASPEcTs OF CERTIFICATION AND ACCREDITATION 103 (Donald G. Langsley
ed., 1981).
272. Bane et al., supra note 42, at 42 (stating that day care centers must comply with
federal requirements and regulations to receive federal funds).
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already laid, certification and accreditation requirements are an
underutilized means of attacking the employee child abuse prob-
lem. In addition, allowing institutions in which employees have
previously committed abuse to remain certified is contrary to
public policy.
Moreover, an institution's unreasonable reliance on the certi-
fication process may arguably create exposure to liability. In D.T.
v. Independent School District,23 the school district relied on the
fact that individuals with criminal records cannot be certified as
teachers, and therefore did not perform a criminal background
check on an applicant who was later accused of abusing several
students. A criminal background check would have revealed the
applicant's prior conviction for sodomy.274 Basing important and
potentially harmful decisions on the presumed nonnegligence of
others is inappropriate when children are involved.- 5
With employees who are not subject to specific licensure stan-
dards, the institution must at least assure itself of the employee's
fitness and competency. The duty rests solely on the institution,
and if it fails to meet its duty by not hiring competent personnel,
the institution may be liable for the employee's malpractice2 6
Malpractice liability offers another avenue of recovery against
institutions employing professionals. Malpractice liability adapts
the basic principles of negligence (duty, breach, causation, in-
jury)277 to certain professional fields that are subject to a second
standard of care beyond the ordinary duty to exercise reasonable
care. The additional duty requires professionals to "possess a
standard minimum of special knowledge and ability.2 7 8 Failure
to meet the appropriate standard results in malpractice liability.
Punishing the Institution Is Necessary and Justified
The criminal justice system punishes undesirable conduct based
on the following theories: 79 prevention,280 restraint,281 rehabilita-
273. 894 F.2d 1176 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 213 (1990).
274. Id. at 1178-79.
275. But see id. at 1194 (holding that school district was not liable for failing to investigate
completely the teacher's background).
276. Hipp v. Hospital Auth., 121 S.E.2d 273, 275 (Ga. Ct. App. 1961).
277. Intentional acts also may constitute malpractice. Waters v. Bourhis, 709 P.2d 469, 475
(Cal. 1985).
278. KEETON ET AL., supra note 39, S 32, at 185.
279. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 23-26 (2d ed. 1986).
280. Also commonly referred to as particular deterrence. Id.
281. Also commonly referred to as incapacitation, isolation, or disablement. Id.
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tion, deterrence, education, and retribution. 28 These theories
interact and conflict;m some cases gear punishment toward the
individual criminal, hence particular deterrence and incapacitation
are appropriate goals. In other cases, the crime committed de-
termines the punishment, thus ignoring the criminal and attempt-
ing to deter any further commission of the crime.s 4
The criminal law theories of punishment provide a sound anal-
ogy for imposing civil liability on institutions for child abuse
committed by their employees. Imposing liability on an institution
may deter the specific institution's management, supervisors, or
coemployees from concealing the abuse.25
Because "[t]he ideal approach to child abuse is prevention,' 2 6
imposing liability may activate and educate an institution, leading
to a heightened awareness and the prevention of future occur-
rences. Similarly, the institution may offer programs to rehabil-
itate employees with known deficiencies and proclivities in order
to avoid later liability.
Most importantly, imposing liability provides compensation to
the victim, 287 which may provide necessary counseling to aid the
child and his or her family in recovering from the ordeal.28
282. Retribution is sometimes referred to as "just desserts." Id.
283. Id. at 27.
284. Id. at 28. For example, in drug cases, judges are authorized to impose punishment
based on the charges against the defendant. A person found guilty of possessing a kilogram
of marijuana might be sentenced to one year in prison, with the length of the sentence
determined by the amount of the drug possessed, rather than the circumstances of the
defendant as an individual.
285. In many professions, the members obey a "code of silence" that serves as a blockade
against any inquiries concerning members' actions. KEETON ET AL., supra note 39, § 32, at
188. The medical profession, in particular, is known for its code of silence. Id. at 188 n.50.
286. Horowitz & Duff, supra note 41, pt. II, at 2.
287. The family of the victim generally is not successful in recovering damages; some
parents attempt emotional distress claims, but courts generally deny recovery because the
parents did not actually witness the abuse and their claims are therefore noncontemporaneous
torts. See Cordts v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 252 Cal. Rptr. 629 (Ct. App. 1988) (denying
parents' cause of action because not direct victims); Miller v. Cook, 273 N.W.2d 567 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1978) (denying parents' request for damages because no action exists for mental
anguish sustained upon learning of a noncontemporaneous tort upon a family member). In
Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, Inc., the court permitted the mother's
claim to go to trial, but only because the psychotherapist undertook an obligation to treat
both mother and son. 770 P.2d 278, 282-83 (Cal. 1989). The subsequent abuse of the son
breached the duty the therapist owed to the mother and gave her a cause of action. Id.
288. By comparison, in Great Britain, many families fail to receive compensation because
they are unaware of the help available. Craig Seton, Campaign to Compensate Victims of
Child Abuse, THE TIMEs (London), Sept. 26, 1990. Parents often sue the perpetrator but
overlook other sources of compensation, such as Great Britain's Criminal Injuries Compen-
sation Board. Id. One innovative source of compensation is the Massachusetts Children's
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Generally, avenues of recovery are very limited in abuse cases;
it is thus necessary to find additional recourses for the victims.289
Adequate treatment could rehabilitate eighty percent of fami-
lies.29 Penalties against the institution serve as just desserts for
its actions, particularly in cases in which employers actively ratify
the abuse. In some cases, punishment of the employer is second-
ary to the need to compensate the victim. Compensation not only
serves the family's physical needs but also assists in emotional
healing by relieving the family of any guilt.291
A Matter of Trust
Above all, parents entrust the care and safekeeping of their
children to various institutions;292 in some instances, employers
flagrantly violate that trust, to the detriment of the most innocent
of victims. The violation of trust can result in children suffering
abuse and accompanying irreparable physical and psychological
injuries.293 As a matter of public policy, institutions that volun-
tarily assume the great responsibility of child care and supervi-
sion cannot continue to breach their duties without punishment:
"[I]t is better to impose liability on someone [here, the institution]
who has caused no harm . . . than to leave uncompensated
someone [here, the child] who clearly has been wronged." 294 Al-
though in some cases the institutions arguably did not directly
Trust Fund, which receives revenue from the Massachusetts Lottery. Gloria Negri, Bill
Proposes to Tap Lottery to Fund War on Child Abuse, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 2, 1991, at 13.
Even though the victim may find an avenue of recovery, statutes of limitations may block
pursuit of the cause of action. Salten, supra note 24, at 190-91. Also, the victim must pursue
the cause of action personally or with a guardian. Intentional infliction of emotional distress
actions brought by the family of the victim generally are not permitted because of the lapse
in time between the abuse and distress. Miller, 273 N.W.2d at 568-69.
289. M. LaVonne Thompson, Civil Suit: An Abused Child's Only Protection, 6 PROBATE L.J.
85, 87 (1984).
290. H.R. REP. No. 685, supra note 10, at 4, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2766 (statement
of Dr. Brandt Steele and Brian Fraser of the National Center for the Prevention of Child
Abuse and Neglect of the University of Colorado Medical Center).
291. See also Dick Dahl, Making Sex Abusers Pay, MAss. LAW. WKLY., Apr. 15, 1991, at 33
(reporting that a victim's suit against a perpetrator has therapeutic value and may relieve
feelings of victimization).
292. See A.L. v. Commonwealth, 521 N.E.2d 1017, 1022 n.10 (Mass. 1988) (stating that the
children's parents, denied access to teacher's criminal record, had no choice but to rely on
institution to protect their children).
293. Doe v. Durtschi, 716 P.2d 1238, 1241 (Idaho 1986) (minor plaintiffs alleging such
injuries).
294. HUBER, supra note 37, at 81 (discussing alternative liability generally).
1336 [Vol. 33:1295
EMPLOYEE CHILD ABUSE
cause the harm, they are by no means innocent bystanders.2 5
Institutions are in the best position to prevent employee abuse
and may do so without undue expense. Adequately investigating
new employees, by means of personal references, contacts with
former employers and coworkers, and, if the employee previously
worked with children, with those children's parents, is the first
step. Following standard operating procedures and expending a
small amount of additional effort by employers could do much to
prevent employee abuse from occurring.
Employee abuse is preventable after the hiring stage as well.
Most importantly, an institution cannot fail to investigate every
rumor, suggestion, or intimation of suspicious activity. Adequate
supervision-regular monitoring and evaluation of employee con-
duct as opposed to constant behind-the-scenes surveillance-is a
must. Training and workshops on the facts and dynamics of child
abuse may also be helpful; at a minimum, they create awareness
among coworkers. Finally, to prepare for any employee abuse
that may occur, an institution should seek insurance coverage,
budget funds for settling claims, or at the very least establish
an emergency fund for use in compensating the victims and their
families.
CONCLUSION
Child abuse committed by adults responsible for a child's care
occurs often, and its frequency is increasing.26 In the institutional
setting, the volume of lawsuits brought by victims against their
abusers and the abusers' employers reflects the growing number
of reported cases and also the growing need for a solution.m The
courts, however, relying on flawed analysis and outmoded im-
munities, traditionally have refused to hold institutions liable for
child abuse committed by their employees.P8
By avoiding the imposition of liability on institutions, courts
perpetuate the vicious cycle of abuse: abused children become
295. Prevention is not solely the responsibility of the institution, of course. Parents must
continually monitor to ensure that institutions properly care for their children; this Note by
no means suggests the abdication of parental responsibilities. However, in doing what is
best for their children, parents must send them to school, church, and play. In doing so,
parents trust the institutional caretakers to do their best for the children as well.
296. See supra notes 4-7, 11.
297. See generally supra notes 4-7 (documenting the increased incidence and reporting of
child abuse in the United States).
298. See supra notes 51-212 and accompanying text.
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abusive adults.m Failure to impose liability may deprive victims
of resources necessary for recovery, and the poor success rate
of victim claims discourages other victims from bringing suit
against truly culpable institutions. Although strict liability pro-
vides one possible way to increase the number of successful
claims, the harsh effects on public institutions potentially under-
mine that approach. Rather, broadening the liability base to
include the supervising institution when the abuse occurred due
to intentional wrongdoing or negligence by the institution satis-
factorily meets the needs of the child and justly punishes the
institution.3 0
To improve the plight of abused children, the judicial system
need not devote all of its creative energies to fashioning new
theories or gearing up its strict liability mechanisms. Several
effective rationales already exist to attack the child abuse crisis
occurring in institutions, including negligent hiring and supervi-
sion, vicarious liability, and constitutional remedies. As this Note
reviewed, these doctrines need adjustment to meet the facts of
child abuse cases, but a major judicial overhaul is unnecessary.
Courts should not delay in responding to the child abuse
crisis.30 1 The legal community's failure to address the issue ap-
pears to be passive condonation, which makes the legal system
equally culpable as the institution allowing the abuse to occur.302
Courts contribute to the prevalence of child abuse when they fail
to appreciate that "[n]ot only are child abuse and neglect wrong,
but the nation's lack of an effective response to them is also
wrong." 3 The United States Advisory Board on Child Abuse
and Neglect encourages active public involvment in child abuse
prevention, and "urge[s] all citizens 'to recognize that a serious
emergency. . . exists within American society. . . . [E]ach Amer-
ican [must] understand that he or she is personally responsible
for preventing harm to all the maltreated children of the na-
299. RONALD B. FLOWERS, CHILDREN AND CRIMINALITY: THE CHILD AS VICTIM AND PERPE-
TRATOR 92 (1986); Reidy, supra note 25, at 471; see also VINCENT J. FONTANA & DOUGLAS J.
BESHARoV, THE MALTREATED CHILD 12, 27-30 (3d ed. 1977) (discussing various social and
family experiences that may cause a person to grow into a child abuser). The problem comes
full circle when the abused child-abusive adult enters the child care field and seeks out
victims, thus allowing the horrible history to repeat itself. Schaefer, supra note 6, at 1441.
300. PROSSER, supra note 99, at 464, 553.
301. Gil, supra note 16, at 126-27.
302. Indeed, one author suggested that legal institutions contribute to the prevalence of
abuse and, with cultural and social factors, are a source of child abuse. Id at 120-22.
303. Cimons, supra note 45, at A12 (quoting a report of the U.S. Advisory Board on Child
Abuse and Neglect released June 26, 1990).
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tion.' ",304 The American people have responded with legal action 31 5
and by entrusting the care of their children to the judicial system.
Jessica Lynch
304. Id.
305. Even Congress has responded. See Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 5101-5106 (1988). The Act established a National Center on Child Abuse and
Neglect, an advisory board, an interagency task force, and a national clearinghouse. Id. §S
5101-5104. The Act also makes provisions for research, financial, and educational grants and
programs. Id. SS 5105-5106. These government resources are intended to prevent and treat
child abuse and neglect. More recently, a bill has been proposed in Congress to create a
national child abuse registry. See supra note 97; Anne Groer, Girl Inspires Bill to Track
Abusers, CHI. Tam., Oct. 27, 1991, at C8.
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